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Assistant Professor of Economics
ABSTRACT
This dissertation consists of three essays on firm dynamics, concentrating on nomi-
nal rigidities and their implications for monetary policy, the asset pricing implications
of productivity growth, and firm dynamics with firm-specific intangible investment.
In Chapter 1, I present a theoretical model in which price setting firms decide what
to pay attention to and how much attention to pay, subject to cognition inability, in a
world of sparsity-based bounded rationality as in Gabaix (2014). Unlike the rational
inattention approach of Sims (2003) in which firms reset prices every period with a
fixed amount of attention, the sparsity-based approach allows for the possibility that
prices remain fixed for some time even if they can be adjusted every period at no
physical cost and amounts of attention allocated can vary. Inaction in price setting
arises if variations of both aggregate and idiosyncratic conditions are sufficiently small
so that firms allocate zero attention to both conditions. Moreover, firms dynamically
allocate more attention to one condition than the others if that condition is more
variable than the others. The model qualitatively matches the price change behavior
in micro data in which prices react quickly and by large amounts to idiosyncratic
shocks, but only slowly and by small amounts to nominal shocks. Nominal shocks
v
can give rise to very strong and persistent real effects when the uncertainty of aggre-
gate condition is sufficiently low. This means monetary policy is less effective in an
economy with higher volatility.
Chapter 2 examines the asset pricing implications of technology innovation and
productivity improvement. We provide new evidence about the link between firm-
level total factor productivity (TFP) gap and the value premium. The TFP gap of a
firm is the TFP level of a firm relative to that of its industry frontier. We estimate
the firm-level TFP gap and show that it is strongly correlated to firm-level book-to-
market ratio. Small productivity gap firms exhibit a low book-to-market ratio, that
is, they are growth firms, and vice versa. We assume these firms are early innovators
and keep track of the frontier closely and therefore expose more to the frontier risk.
We show that a production-based asset pricing model with a creative destruction
mechanism in which firms have growth options to upgrade their technology to the
latest vintage or not can replicate the empirical relationship between TFP gaps and
firm characteristics. The model implies that firms with lower opportunity costs to
innovate are more likely to innovate. Moreover, such firms rely more on growth
options and are more exposed to productivity shocks. If the shocks bear a negative
price of risk, meaning technology improves during the course of a recession, then such
firms yield relatively low expected returns. Holding such firms in a portfolio hedge
against bad times.
Chapter 3 investigates simple models of firm investment under uncertainty which
usually lack an internal mechanism to propagate shocks. I, by contrast, build a firm
investment model with a time-to-build feature in firm-specific intangible investment
to generate internal propagation in macroeconomics. The firm-specific nature of
intangible capital implies there is no market to trade it across firms, and therefore
firms have to use factor inputs to produce this type of capital internally by themselves
vi
over time. Firms that are characterized by a higher intangible share exhibit a more
hump-shaped impulse response with a more delayed peak even without explicitly
adding adjustment cost components to the simple model. Producing intangible capital
internally is a real friction and can be a micro-foundation of adjustment costs. Internal
intangible capital accumulation provides a Q-theory style of firm investment. In
addition, introducing firm-specific intangible capital also introduces a time-varying
wedge between factor prices and marginal products. The degree of firm-specificity
determines the size of the wedges.
vii
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Price-setting under Bounded Rationality
1.1 Introduction
Price-setting dynamics in firms has long been a research focus in macroeconomics.
Understanding its dynamics contributes to designing a more effective monetary pol-
icy. This chapter aims to investigate the price setting in the environment of bounded
rationality. In the standard New Keynesian (NK) framework under rational expec-
tations, agents process all information available in the economy to make decisions
and optimize their behavior. On the other hand, boundedly rational agents make
decisions based on incomplete information. For this reason, agents must optimally
allocate their limited attention across a set of observable economic variables that in-
fluence their decision-making and choose what information to pay attention to. The
slow adjustment of the aggregate price level in the two frameworks arises from dif-
ferent origins. Nominal rigidities in the NK models usually follow an exogenously
specified rule that only a fixed proportion of firms can adjust their prices each period
(Calvo, 1983). In contrast, price setting mechanisms under imperfect information
can also generate a similar kind of price rigidity, see, for instance, Sims (2003) and
Mackowiak and Wiederholt (2009).
Sims (2003) and Mackowiak and Wiederholt (2009) suggest that a convincing
model of real effects of monetary policy due to imperfect information must have the
following two characteristics. First, information on the current state of monetary
policy must be publicly available. Second, it must be optimal for decision-makers to
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pay little attention to this information. Mackowiak and Wiederholt (2009) develop a
model with both of these features. More specifically, price setting firms decide what
conditions to pay attention to. Firms’ limited attention is modeled as a constraint
on information flow, as in Sims (2003), that is, the firms are rational inattention.
The limitations of this approach are that without a menu cost structure, firms can
adjust prices every period at no physical cost, and the amount of attention allocated
to economic variables is constant.
To tackle these issues, I also build a convincing model without losing the two
characteristics suggested by Sims (2003) and Mackowiak and Wiederholt (2009). In
the model, price setting firms decide what to pay attention to and how much attention
to pay. Firms’ inability to attend perfectly to all available information is modeled
as a limited cognition behavior, as in Gabaix (2014), also known as the sparsity-
based approach to bounded rationality, rather than optimizing behavior subject to an
information flow constraint. The profit-maximizing price depends on the price level,
real aggregate demand, and an idiosyncratic state variable that reflects firm-specific
cost or demand conditions. I close the model by specifying exogenous stochastic
processes for the nominal aggregate demand and the idiosyncratic state variable that
reflects the firm-specific conditions.
The model has the following implications. The responses of prices to shocks can
be very sticky. The degree of stickiness in a particular response depends on the
amount of attention allocated to that type of shock. Unlike the rational inattention
approach, the sparsity-based approach allows a possibility that prices remain fixed
for some time even they can be adjusted every period at no physical cost, and the
amount of attention allocation can vary across time. The reason for inaction in
price reset is that if both aggregate and idiosyncratic conditions are not sufficiently
volatile, firms allocate zero attention to both conditions because profit losses from
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not paying attention are small in low uncertainty states. In other words, severe
inattention generates inaction in price reset. Moreover, firms pay more attention to a
particular condition than the others if that condition is more variable than the others.
The amounts of attention allocation can be time-varying if the volatility is time-
varying. For instance, if idiosyncratic conditions are more variable than aggregate
conditions, the firms will pay more attention to the idiosyncratic conditions than to
the aggregate conditions. In this situation, prices then respond strongly and quickly
to the idiosyncratic shocks, but only react weakly and slowly to aggregate shocks.
Furthermore, feedback effects kick in since firms observe endogenous variables such
as the price level and real aggregate demand. When other firms allocate limited
attention to the aggregate conditions, the price level reacts less to a nominal shock
than the situation with the absence of bounded rationality. If prices are strategic
complements, this implies that each firm has even less incentive to allocate attention
to aggregate conditions. Hence, the price level reacts even less to a nominal shock,
and so on.
The sparsity-based approach is also relatively more tractable than the rational
inattention approach since an analytical solution can be derived easily. Given this
particular structure of the model, it can help explain and understand the large average
absolute size of price changes observed in microdata in which prices react fast and
by large amounts to idiosyncratic shocks, but only slowly and by small amounts to
nominal shocks. Nominal shocks can lead to very strong and persistent real effects
when the uncertainty of aggregate condition is very low.
The model has some limitations. First, in some theoretical price-setting models,
optimal pricing so is straightforward that it is perhaps unclear why agents make errors
at all. I assume in reality, setting the profit-maximizing price is complicated; how-
ever, we economists simplify the real world. In the world of my model, I assume that
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the optimal price-setting is complicated, and agents can only perceive a simplified
version of their world. I study the implications from this point of view. Second, it is
hard to calibrate the parameter that determines the cognition inability. Therefore, I
only perform algebraic analysis and leave the calibration exercise for further research.
Third, of course, in reality, we do observe menu costs, but in my model, prices also
remain fixed for some time due to severe inattention even without imposing a menu
cost structure.1 Perhaps, in reality, a combination of menu costs and bounded ratio-
nality exists.2 I leave adding a menu cost component as further research. I speculate
that incorporating a menu cost is likely to boost the real effects of nominal shocks
even further.
1.2 Literature review
In the literature, several theories have been proposed to model price rigidities.
In most of the New Keynesian models, firms’ price-setting behavior is time-
dependent, staggered, and forward-looking, exhibiting rational expectations. Many
of these models which build on the works of Rotemberg (1982) and Calvo (1983),
assume that only a fixed proportion of firms adjust their prices each period whereas
the remaining maintain the same prices. This assumption leads to a slow adjustment
of prices over time and hence results in nominal frictions in the economy. Inflation
dynamics in nominal rigidity models are represented by a relationship between cur-
rent inflation, expected future inflation, and a measure of real output gap or markup
which is known as the New Keynesian Phillips Curve (NKPC). However, the forward-
looking NKPC has some shortcomings. Fuhrer and Moore (1995) illustrate that the
rigid price mechanism indicates a much lower degree of persistence of inflation than
1See Gertler and Leahy (2008), Golosov and Jr. (2007), Midrigan (2011), and Nakamura and
Steinsson (2010) for menu cost models calibrated to match microdata on prices.
2To my knowledge, Baley and Blanco (2017) is the first paper that studies menu cost, information
friction, and idiosyncratic uncertainty jointly.
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the empirical measure. Also, the mechanism does not produce a hump-shaped re-
sponse of inflation to nominal shocks. The NKPC assumes forward-looking expecta-
tions and reacts directly to exogenous shocks, which is contradictory to the inertial
behavior of inflation.
To improve the empirical fitting of the NKPC, researchers have introduced backward-
looking components into the setting which results in a lagged inflation term into the
NKPC. This setting produces greater inflation persistence, and fit the data better.
However, the presence of the lagged inflation term is subject to debate. Gali and
Gertler (1999) justify it by proposing that a particular fraction of firms follow a rule-
of-thumb behavior and set their prices based on past inflation. Similarly, Christiano
et al. (2005) propose firms that do not change their prices index their price contracts
to past inflation. These treatments are criticized for their lack of micro-foundations
(Rudd and Whelan, 2007). Moreover, Nakamura and Steinsson (2008) find that
consumer prices in the US remain fixed for several periods, with an implied median
duration of four to five months. This contradicts the price indexation approach, which
suggests that prices change every period. Further, Woodford (2007) argues that even
if indexation does take place, there is skepticism as to why this approach should be
adopted.
The standard New Keynesian model with Calvo pricing assumes an ad-hoc process
for price-stickiness and assumes agents have full information rational expectations.
However, there is pervasive empirical evidence that against firms set price under full
information and favors the presence of information rigidities, see, for example Coibion
and Gorodnichenko (2012), Coibion and Gorodnichenko (2015), Coibion et al. (2017a)
and Coibion et al. (2017b). For instance, in Coibion et al. (2017b), from a New
Zealand firm dataset, they find many firms do not consider inflation as an important
factor in their decisions, and hence they tend to allocate few resources to collecting
6
and processing information about inflation.
My work builds on Gabaix (2014) which argues that agents cannot attend per-
fectly to all available information. He proposes modeling agents’ limited attention
as agents’ trade-off between the benefits of learning their own perceived world (by
reducing their utility loss from misperception) and the costs of paying more attention.
My work is also related to the literature on the real effects of monetary policy due
to imperfect information. Woodford (2003a) builds a model in which firms observe
nominal aggregate demand with exogenous idiosyncratic noise. In his work, he postu-
lates that firms pay little attention to aggregate conditions. I identify the situations
under which firms allocate limited attention to aggregate conditions, and I investigate
how the optimal attention allocation and the optimal pricing depend on the firms’
environment. Mankiw and Reis (2002) build a different model in which firms update
information sets slowly. They postulate that in each period, a proportion of firms
obtain perfect information regarding all current and past shocks, whereas all remain-
ing firms set prices based on past information. Reis (2006) illustrates that a model
with a fixed cost of updating information can deliver a micro-foundation for this kind
of slow information acquisition. In Mankiw and Reis (2002) and Reis (2006), prices
react with equal speed to all shocks. In my model, instead, prices do not react to
some innovations and shrinkingly to other innovations.
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. Section 1.3 presents the settings of
the model. Section 1.4 derives the firms’ price setting behavior for a given allocation
of attention and solves the model analytically. Section 1.5 presents and discusses




The economy has a continuum of firms indexed by i ∈ [0, 1], and the time is indexed
by t. In each period t = 1, 2, ..., firm i sells good i and sets their price of the good,






βτ−tπ (Piτ , Pτ , Yτ , Ziτ )
]
, (1.1)
where Eit is the conditional expectation operator on information of firm i in period
t, β ∈ (0, 1) is a discount factor, and π (Piτ , Pτ , Yτ , Ziτ ) is a general function of real
profit flows in period t4 in which the real profits depend on the price set by the
firm, Pit, the aggregate price level, Pt, the real aggregate demand or output, Yt , and
an idiosyncratic state variable incorporating demand conditions and/or firm-specific
cost, Zit.
Assume prices are physically fully flexible, that is, firms are allowed to adjust
prices at no physical cost in each period. For all t, firms take the whole sequences of
price level, Pt, real aggregate demand, Yt, and the idiosyncratic states, Zit, as given.
These implies that the price-setting problem becomes a static one:
max
Pit
Eit [π (Pit, Pt, Yt, Zit)] . (1.2)
3I adopt the notation of Woodford (2003b), and the model structure follows Mackowiak and
Wiederholt (2009) closely for tractability purposes.
4For tractability, I assume that the function π is twice continuously differentiable and homoge-
neous of degree zero in its first two arguments. This implies the real profits depend only on the
relative price Pit/Pt. Further, I also assume that π function has a global maximum in Pit for given
Pt, Yt, and Zit. A standard model of monopolistic competition satisfies these assumptions.
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I assume an exogenous stochastic process for nominal aggregate demand:5
Qt = PtYt, (1.3)
and denote qt = lnQt − ln Q̄ the log-deviation of nominal aggregate demand from its
non-stochastic value. I postulate qt follows an exogenous process with mean zero and
finite variance.






I assume an exogenous stochastic process for the idiosyncratic state variables.
Denote zit = lnZit − ln Z̄ the log-deviation of idiosyncratic state variable i from its
non-stochastic value. I postulate that the zit, i ∈ [0, 1], follow a common stationary
process with mean zero and finite variance. Moreover, I assume that the processes
{zit}, i ∈ [0, 1], are pairwise independent and independent of {qt}. From Theorem 2
in Uhlig (1996), I then have
1∫
0
zitdi = 0. (1.5)
Next, following Gabaix (2014), I model limited attention as cognitive costs on
learning the perfectly rational world. Adopting this view, I propose that having
limited attention due to costs on cognition is a good approximation of the mental
resources required to make better decisions: (1) If the cost of cognition is low, the
price setting behavior is close to the rational profit-maximizing pricing behavior; (2) If
the decision maker pays more attention to a variable, mistakes in the response to that
variable become small; and (3) The decision maker needs to allocate more attention
5This assumption is widely adopted in the literature. For instance, Lucas (1972), Woodford
(2003a), Mankiw and Reis (2002), and Reis (2006) also assume an exogenous stochastic process for
nominal aggregate demand.
6One will obtain the same expression in a standard model of monopolistic competition after a
log-linearization.
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to a variable with high variance. The following subsection states the concept formally.
1.3.2 Modeling limited cognition – the sparse max for static problems
To model bounded rationality, I rely on a tractable static framework in the work
of Gabaix (2014). There, the core is a sparse max or smax operator, which is a
generalized, behavioral version of the traditional max operator of maximization.
The agent faces a maximization problem which is, in its rational version,
max
Pit
Eit [π (Pit, Pt, Yt, Zit)]
There is an attention vector, m, and an attention-dependent extension of the objective
function, Eit [π (Pit, Pt, Yt, Zit,m)]. For example, I can take
Eit [π (Pit, Pt, Yt, Zit,m)] := Eit [π (Pit,mpPt,myYt,mzZit)] (1.6)
to be the perceived utility function when the consumer is partially inattentive to the
state variables. When mk = 1, the agent fully perceives dimension k; whereas mk = 0,
the agent is pay no attention to it. Attention generates a price setting,
P ∗it (Pit, Pt, Yt, Zit,m) := arg max
Pit
Eit [π (Pit, Pt, Yt, Zit,m)] . (1.7)
There is a default attention vector md, taken to be 0, and a default price setting,
P dit
(
















, evaluated at (Pit,m) = (P
d
it,m
d), the impact on the price
setting of a change in attention. Therefore, Pit,mk = −Π−1PitPitΠPitmk , where Π :=
Eit [π (Pit, Pt, Yt, Zit,m)], Π
−1
PitPit
is the inverse of the second derivatives of Π with
respect to Pit, and ΠPitmk is the cross derivatives of Π with respect to Pit and mk.
When (1.6) holds, Pit,mk = Pit,Xk(X,m)|m=(1,...,1),X=0Xk, where X = (Pt, Yt, Zit) is the
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state vector and Xk is its k-th element.
There is a nonnegative parameter κ, which is a cognition cost. When κ = 0, the
agent is the fully rational agent. The Xk are viewed by the agent as being drawn from
a distribution with standard deviation σk which can be time-varying and endogenous.
The following definition and lemma follow closely from Gabaix (2014).





Pit, Pt, Yt, Zit,m
d
)]
, is defined by the following procedure (Gabaix,
2014).
Step 1: Choose the attention vector m∗:







(1−mj)Λjk(1−mk) + κg(mk −md)
]
(1.9)
with the cost-of-inattention factors Λjk := −E[Pit,mjΠPitPitPit,mk ], g′ > 0.
Step 2: Choose the action:
Pits = arg max
Pit
Eit [π (Pit, Pt, Yt, Zit,m
∗)] , (1.10)
and set the resulting profit function to be Πs = arg maxPit Eit [π (P
s
it, Pt, Yt, Zit,m
∗)].









In other words, the agent solves for the optimal m∗ which trades off a proxy
for the profit losses (the first term on the right-hand side of equation (1.9) and a
psychological penalty for deviations from a behavioral or sparse model (the second
term on the right-hand side of equation (1.9)). Next, the agent maximizes over the
action Pit, as if m
∗ were the true model. This problem can be solved by backward
induction.
Let the agent consider only the diagonal terms. Define the attention function:









This is the optimal attention to a variable with variance |v|, normalizing other factors
to unity.








As mentioned in Gabaix (2014), this formula allows a simple “plug and play” solution
for the two-step problem: to allocate attention to dimension k, just use (1.12). It’s
unnecessary to go back to the background problem (1.9). The following Lemma
derives a typical case.
Lemma 1 (Basic simple case for smax) In the case Eit [π (Pit, Pt, Yt, Zit,m)] =




























= −Π−1PitPit ·ΠPitmk . In the expressions above, derivatives are evalu-
ated at x = 0 and P dit = arg maxPit Eit [π (Pit, 0, 0, 0)].
The intuition is that the state variables are truncated. If |Pit,xk | is small enough, so
that the k-th state variable shouldn’t matter much anyway, then m∗k = 0, and the















An equilibrium of the economy are the allocations for the attentions vector, {m}, the
prices, {Pit}, the aggregate price level, {Pt}, and real aggregate demand, {Yt}, such
that:
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1. Given the processes {Pt}, {Yt}, and {Zit}, all firm i ∈ [0, 1] chooses the allo-
cations for the attentions vector, {m}, in period t = 0 according to expression
(1.9) and sets the price for its good according to expression (1.10); and
2. In all period t = 1, 2, ..., and in all state, the price level is given by expression
(1.4) and real aggregate demand is given by expression (1.3).
1.4 Price-setting
In this section7, I first derive the price-setting behavior in the absence of bounded
rationality. Then, I determine the optimal allocation of attention and the price set-
ting behavior under bounded rationality. For tractability, I apply a log-quadratic
approximation to the profit function around the non-stochastic solution of the model.
This gives a log-linear equation for the profit-maximizing price.
1.4.1 Optimal price-setting in the absence of bounded rationality
Let Qt = Q̄ for all t and Zit = Z̄ for all i, t. Then, the price set by firm i in period t
is
π1(Pit, Pt, Yt, Z̄) = 0, (1.16)
where π1 is the derivative of the profit function with respect to its first argument. As
all firms set the same price, in equilibrium, we have
π1(Pt, Pt, Yt, Z̄) = 0. (1.17)
As π is homogeneous of degree zero in its first two arguments, its first derivative, π1 is
homogeneous of degree negative one. Multiplying the last expression by Pt to obtain:
π1(1, 1, Yt, Z̄) = 0. (1.18)
7Although we have a different mechanism of cognitive friction, I follow the notations of Mackowiak
and Wiederholt (2009) closely for tractability purposes.
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This expression characterizes the equilibrium real aggregate demand, denoted as Ȳ .





Then, I apply a log-quadratic approximation to the profit function around the non-
stochastic solution of the model. Denote π̂ the profit function in log-deviation form:
π̂(pit, pt, yt, zit) = π(P̄ e
pt , , P̄ ept , Ȳ eyt , Z̄ezit), where a lower case letter is the log-
deviation of the variable evaluated at its non-stochastic solution, for example, pit =
lnPit − ln P̄ . Let π̃ be the second-order Taylor approximation of the function π̂ at
the origin:
π̃(pit, pt, yt, zit) = π̂1pit+
π̂11
2
p2it+π̂12pitpt+π̂13pityt+π̂14pitzit+terms independent of pit,
(1.20)
where π̂1, is the derivative of π̂ with respect to its first argument evaluated at the
origin. One can show that π̂1 = 0, π̂11 < 0, and π̂12 = −π̂11.
Next, The optimal price set by firm i in the absence of bounded rationality in
period t is given by







The profit-maximizing price in the absence of bounded rationality is log-linear in the
price level, the real aggregate demand, and the idiosyncratic state. The ratio, π̂13|π̂11| , is
the elasticity of the optimal price to real aggregate demand. The lower the value of
the ratio, the higher the degree of real rigidity according to Ball and Romer (1990).
The ratio, π̂14|π̂11| , determines the elasticity of the optimal price to idiosyncratic states.
I denote ∆t = pt +
π̂13
|π̂11|yt the profit-maximizing response to aggregate conditions.
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One can then write the pricing decision (1.21) as




If firms are not boundedly rational, then all firms set the profit-maximizing price.
Summing over all i of the profit-maximizing price (1.21) and using equations (1.3) -











The fixed point of this function is the equilibrium price level in the absence of bounded
rationality. Suppose π̂13 6= 0, one can obtain the unique fixed point:
prt = qt. (1.24)
Therefore, in the absence of bounded rationality, the aggregate price level moves
one-for-one with nominal aggregate demand, that is, there is no real effect from a
nominal shock implying money is neutral at any point of time and monetary policy
is completely ineffective in stimulating the real economy.
1.4.2 Optimal price setting under bounded rationality
Next, consider the objective function of a firm under bounded rationality:
π̃(pit,∆t, zit,m) = π̂1pit+
π̂11
2
p2it+|π̂11|pitm∆∆t+π̂14pitmzzit+terms independent of pit,
(1.25)
To obtain the optimal allocation of attention and price-setting, one can simply “plug
and play” using definition 1 and lemma 1. The optimality condition of the sparse
max problem (1.25) is





Applying expression (1.15), the optimal allocation of attention to the aggregate con-







where σ2∆ to be determined in the equilibrium because ∆t = pt +
π̂13
|π̂11|yt, defined
previously, is endogenous. It can be time-varying if one specify a time-varying process
for the volatility of the nominal demand innovation. Moreover, if the firms consider
the price-setting problem ex-post, that is, after observing the shocks, then σ2∆ can be
replaced by the squared variation, ∆2t , suggested by Gabaix (2014).
Similarly, the optimal allocation of attention to idiosyncratic condition, m∆, is









Here, σ2z is exogenous, and again, can be time-varying if one specify a time-varying
process for the idiosyncratic innovation volatility. Again, if the firms consider the
price-setting problem ex-post, i.e., after observing the shocks, then σ2z can be replaced
by the squared variation, z2t .
Figure 1·1 depicts an attention function in which π̂11 and π̂14 are both normalized
to one for an illustration purpose. Given a cognitive cost, κ, when the variance is
lower than one, there is a region of perfect inattention. When the variance is higher
than one, there is a region of limited attention since the function value is below 1.
The attention function is continuous and asymptotically approaching one when the
variance is getting larger. This function structure allows the possibility of inaction
in price reset for some periods if the variance is time-varying or state-dependent and
that with a high probability that it is very low.
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Figure 1·1: Normalized attention function
Next, I derive the equilibrium of the model and study the effects of the equilibrium
allocation of attention. In this section, I assume that qt has a variance σ
2
q > 0, all the
zit, i ∈ [0, 1], has a variance σ2z > 0. I conjecture that the equilibrium price level is a
log-linear function of nominal aggregate demand:
pst = αqt. (1.29)
This conjecture will be verified. The conjecture implies that the profit-maximizing










If firms are bounded rational, all firms set the profit-maximizing bounded rational
price. Computing the integral over all i of the profit-maximizing price (1.26) and




















) ∈ [0, 1], for m∗∆ ∈ [0, 1]. (1.32)


















From this expression, one can determine the equilibrium variance of the aggregate
conditions, σ2∆, and the optimal attention allocated to aggregate conditions, m
∗
∆, with
fixed point iterations. Without solving it via iterations, from this expression, it can
be shown that σ2∆ ≤ σ2q if π̂13|π̂11| < 1 (if prices are strategic complements). Therefore,
in the presence of bounded rationality, if the firms are not paying full attention to
the aggregate conditions, the price level moves less than one-for-one with nominal
18


















where m∗∆ is given by (1.27) . Its values are between zero and one and can be time-
varying and state-dependent. I am now going to interpret this expression.
First, the price level is unresponsive to the nominal aggregate demand when the
firms have, in a relative sense, a high cognitive cost, or a very low aggregate condition
uncertainty, or a very low curvature of the profit function with respect to its product
price. In this case, the degree of bounded rationality is extremely high, that is, perfect
inattention. Perfect inattention produces inaction or complete stickiness in the price
level. If the aggregate condition uncertainty does not increase, the price level remains
constant forever. The real effect is at the maximum. In other words, real output
moves one-to-one with nominal aggregate demand shock.
Second, the price level is moderately responsive to the nominal aggregate demand
when the firms have, in a relative sense, a moderate cognitive cost, a moderate ag-
gregate condition uncertainty, or a moderate curvature of the profit function with
respect to its product price. In this case, the degree of bounded rationality is mod-
erate, that is, limited attention. Limited attention does not produce inaction at the
price level. It only produces a dampened price level response, that is, moderate price
level stickiness. If the aggregate condition uncertainty does not decrease, complete
stickiness will not arise, and the price level will adjust weakly every period. The
real effect is moderate, that is, real output moves less than one-to-one with nominal
aggregate demand shock.
Third, the price level moves one-for-one with nominal aggregate demand when
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the firms have, in a relative sense, a zero cognitive cost, an extremely high aggregate
condition uncertainty, or an extremely high curvature of the profit function with
respect to its product price. In this case, the degree of bounded rationality is zero,
that is, full attention. This solution is exactly the solution (1.24) in the absence of
bounded rationality. If the aggregate uncertainty does not decrease, dampened price
level response and inaction in price reset do not exist, and the price level will adjust
extremely strongly every period. The real effect is zero in the limit, that is, there
exists nominal neutrality.
Furthermore, feedback effects arise since the optimal price interacts with the pric-
ing of other firms. If the others also pay limited attention to the aggregate conditions,
then the aggregate price level reacts less to a nominal shock than that in the absence
of bounded rationality, whereas the real aggregate demand reacts more to the nomi-
nal shock than that in the absence of bounded rationality. When prices are strategic
complements, that is, if π̂13|π̂11| < 1, then the first effect dominates in the sense that
∆t = pt +
π̂13
|π̂11|(qt − pt) reacts less to a nominal shock than that in the absence of
bounded rationality. Hence, σ2∆ declines. As a result, if prices are strategic comple-
ments, then the others pay limited attention to aggregate conditions indicates that
all firms figure out that they are optimal to pay even less attention to aggregate con-
ditions. Due to this feedback loop, the aggregate price level responds even less to a
nominal shock, and so on. The smaller the π̂13|π̂11| , that is, the higher the degree of real
rigidity, the stronger the feedback effects.







We have seen three possibilities for the aggregate condition term pst , and there are
also three possibilities for the idiosyncratic coefficient term via m∗z. Together, there
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where m∗z is given by (1.28). It is between zero and one and can be time-varying and
state-dependent. Given a case of price level determined:
First, the optimal price set by a bounded rational firm i is unresponsive to the
idiosyncratic condition when the firm has, in a relative sense, a high cognitive cost,
a very low idiosyncratic condition uncertainty, a very low curvature of the profit
function with respect to its product price, or a very low sensitivity of the profit-
maximizing price to the idiosyncratic condition. In this case, the degree of bounded
rationality is extremely high, that is, perfect inattention to the idiosyncratic condition.
Inaction in price reset arises if the firm pays zero attention to both the aggregate
condition and the idiosyncratic condition. If economic uncertainty does not increase,
the optimal price remains fixed forever.
Second, the optimal price is moderately responsive to the idiosyncratic condition
when the firm has, in a relative sense, a moderate cognitive cost, a moderate idiosyn-
cratic condition uncertainty, a moderate curvature of the profit function with respect
to its product price, or a moderate sensitivity of the profit-maximizing price to the
idiosyncratic condition. In this case, the degree of bounded rationality is moderate,
that is, limited attention to the idiosyncratic condition. Limited attention does not
produce inaction in price reset. It only produces a dampened price level response. If
the idiosyncratic condition uncertainty does not decrease, inaction in price reset does
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not arise, and the price will adjust weakly every period.
Third, the optimal price responses as in the absence of bounded rationality, in
a relative sense, an extremely low cognitive cost, an extremely high idiosyncratic
condition uncertainty, an extremely high curvature of the profit function with respect
to its product price, or an extremely high sensitivity of the profit-maximizing price
to the idiosyncratic condition. In this case, the degree of bounded rationality is zero,
that is, full attention to the idiosyncratic condition.
To produce the feature that the price remains fixed for some periods and reset
after that, the model needs time-varying or state-dependent uncertainty in at least
one type of shocks.
Given this particular structure of the model and since there are nine types of
possible outcomes, I suggest it can help explain and understand the large average
absolute size of price changes observed in micro data in which prices react fast and
by large amounts to idiosyncratic shocks, but only slowly and by small amounts to
nominal shocks. Nominal shocks can result in very strong and persistent real effects
when the uncertainty of aggregate condition is very low.
1.5 A simulation exercise
In this section, I simulate the equilibrium of the model for a specific set of param-
eter values. I have to specify the parameters π̂13|π̂11| ,
π̂14
|π̂11| and κ. This section is only
served as an illustration purpose since the calibration for bound rationality is not
straightforward.
In order to simulate the model, I first have to specify the exogenous processes for
nominal aggregate demand and for the idiosyncratic state variables. Mackowiak and
Wiederholt (2009) estimate the equation qt = ρqt−1 + νt, where qt is the deviation
of the log of nominal GNP from its fitted trend. The estimate of ρ is approximately
22
0.95 and the standard deviation of the error term is 0.01. Following their method, I
approximate the estimated process by a process with linear decay that dies out after
20 periods.
I tentative to calibrate the the idiosyncratic state to match the average absolute
size of price adjustments in US micro data. Klenow and Kryvtsov (2008) suggest that
the median price adjusts every three to four months. Conditional on the occasion of a
price change, the average absolute size of the price change is eleven percent. I choose
the standard deviation of zit such that the average absolute size of price adjustments in
my model equals nine percent in the absence of bounded rationality. I leave matching
the mean price set duration for future research.
The ratio, π̂14|π̂11| , representing the elasticity of the optimal price to the idiosyncratic
state has the same equilibrium effects as the variance of the idiosyncratic state. Thus,
I normalize the ratio to one and I calibrate the variance of the idiosyncratic state. On
the other hand, the ratio, π̂13|π̂11| , representing the elasticity of the optimal price to the
real aggregate demand is a standard parameter in monopolistic competition models.
Woodford (2003b) suggests a value between 0.1 and 0.15. I assign π̂13|π̂11| = 0.15.
For a tentative illustration purpose, I choose arbitrary volatility processes for σ2∆







This is an ad-hoc way to generate state-dependent volatilities. They can also be
modeled as stochastic volatility processes. I leave the more rigorous calibration of
these two processes as my future research.
I choose the parameter that determines the cognitive ability such that firms set
prices that are close to the prices in the absence of bounded rationality. Based on
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this reasoning, I set κ = 0.001. These numbers imply that the decision-makers start
paying attention to a shock if and only if one standard deviation of the shock causing
the optimal price changes more than 100κ%, i.e., 0.1% here. Hence, firms set prices
that are fairly close to the prices in the absence of bounded rationality since the cost
of cognition is not high. Therefore, losses in profits due to suboptimal pricing are
small and the marginal cognition cost is low. Thus, firms have little incentive to
decrease attention allocation.
To set the parameter that determines the cognitive ability, one cannot ask oneself
about the cognition ability of humans in the real world and endow decision-makers
in the model with the same ability. The reason is that economic models are simpli-
fications of the real world. For instance, in my model, firms take no decision apart
from the pricing decision and they need only pay attention to one firm-specific vari-
able. One has to choose the parameter that determines the cognitive cost taking into
account the simplicity of the model.
Figures 1·2 summarizes the results for the economy. Firms pay less attention to
aggregate conditions and pay more attention to idiosyncratic states. The optimal
allocation of attention implies the following price-setting behavior. The top panel of
Figure 1·2 shows the impulse response of an individual price to a shock in the id-
iosyncratic state. The response to an idiosyncratic shock under bounded rationality
is not as strong and not quick as the response under full rationality. It is dampened
in the first 13 periods, and then it is completely shut down from period 14 and be-
yond. The reason is that given the specification of the volatility process in (1.38), the
variations of the idiosyncratic state becomes smaller since it is a one-time persistent
shock that its effect decays over time. As the perceived variations decay, the firm
pays less attention to the state over time. Eventually, complete inattention arises as
the variations are sufficiently small, and the response will shut off in the future.
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Figure 3a: Impulse responses of an individual price to an innovation in the idiosycratic state variable
Full Rationality
Bounded Rationality
















































Figure 3b: Impulse responses of an individual price to an innovation in nominal aggregate demand
Full Rationality
Bounded Rationality
Figure 1·2: Impulse responses of an individual price to an innovation
in idiosyncratic state variable
The bottom panel of Figure 1·2 shows the impulse response of an individual price
to a shock in nominal aggregate demand. The response to a nominal shock under
bounded rationality is also dampened completely after the third period. The reasons
are as follows. First, to match the large average absolute size of price changes in
the data, idiosyncratic volatility has an order of magnitude larger than aggregate
volatility. Firms pay more attention to idiosyncratic conditions, implying that prices
respond weakly to changes in aggregate conditions. In fact, due to my assignment
of the calibrated values, and due to the feedback effects came from strategic comple-
mentarity, the response is completely shut off earlier. In this case, the volatility of the
aggregate condition is just way too small compared to that of the idiosyncratic con-
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dition. Therefore, the firms pay no attention to the shock with a size of one standard
deviation in these periods unless the firms are hit by a larger shock.
Under bounded rationality, the impulse response of yt to a shock in nominal
aggregate demand is the difference between qt (the line under full rationality in figure
1·2) and pt (the line under bounded rationality in figure 1·2). Nominal shocks have
very strong and very persistent real effects given that the volatility of the aggregate
conditions is low. And the response function is hump-shaped as the vertical gap is
wider during the mid-periods.
Figures 1·3 and 1·4 show simulated price series. Figure 1·3 shows a sequence of
prices set by a single firm under bounded rationality and a sequence of fully rational
prices. Since I have chosen a relatively high volatility for the idiosyncratic condi-
tion, firms perceive the fully rational price well. In periods with low volatility in all
exogenous conditions, the profit losses deviated from fully rational optimum are not
sufficiently large so that firms pay little or even no attention to any conditions. In
these periods, perfect inattention produces inaction in price reset. In other words,
complete price stickiness arises due to a low uncertainty of economic conditions.
Figure 1·4 shows sequences of aggregate price levels. The price level under bounded
rationality differs significantly from the price level under full rationality. There are
periods that price level remains fixed for a long period. The reason is the optimal
allocation of attention in combination with the feedback effects. The order of mag-
nitude of aggregate condition volatility is much lower than that of the idiosyncratic
conditions, and the feedback effects from strategic complementarity kick in. The com-
bination of these two effects produces a very strong inattention and hence a very high
degree of nominal rigidities in the aggregation. The boundedly rational equilibrium
price level is far away from that of the fully rational equilibrium, even though the
losses in profits due to suboptimal pricing are small.
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Simulated price set by an individual firm
Bounded Rationality
Full Rationality
Figure 1·3: Simulated price set by an individual firm
From this simple illustrative numerical exercise, one can see prices react strongly
and quickly to idiosyncratic shocks, but only weakly and slowly to nominal demand
shocks. This illustration suggests the model structure can then explain why the price
level reacts slowly to nominal shock even individual prices adjust quite frequently and
by large amounts.
1.6 Limitations
My model has some limitations and weaknesses. First, in some theoretical price-
setting models, the optimal pricing procedure is so easy that it may be unclear why
agents keep making errors. I believe in reality, setting the profit-maximizing price can
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Simulated aggregate price level
Bounded Rationality
Full Rationality
Figure 1·4: Simulated aggregate price level
be very complicated8; however, economists simplify the real world and build simple
models. In my work, I assume that the optimal price-setting is very complicated, and
agents can only perceive a simplified version of their world. I study the implications
from this point of view. Second, it is hard to calibrate the parameter value that
determines the cognition inability. Therefore, I only perform mathematical analysis
and leave the rigorous calibration exercise for further research. Third, in reality, we
do observe menu costs, but in my model, prices also remain fixed for some duration
due to severe inattention even without imposing a menu cost structure.9 In reality, a
8Coibion et al. (2017b) provides empirical evidence that only a few firms consider how inflation
affects their business decisions.
9See Gertler and Leahy (2008), Golosov and Jr. (2007), Midrigan (2011), and Nakamura and
Steinsson (2010) for menu cost models calibrated to match microdata on prices.
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combination of menu costs and bounded rationality exists. The interaction between
these two forces can be interesting.10 I leave adding a menu cost for further research.
I speculate that incorporating a menu cost is likely to boost the real effects of nominal
shocks even further. Fourth, I have only studied the behavior of prices. It will be
interesting to extend this model to study inflation dynamics such as inflation inertia.
I leave it for future research.
1.7 Conclusion
Price-setting in traditional imperfection information models such as Mankiw and
Reis (2002) and Mackowiak and Wiederholt (2009) has limitations that without a
menu cost structure, firms can change prices each period at no physical cost, and
the amount of attention allocated to each variable is always constant. To tackle
these issues, I build a convincing model that price-setting firms decide what to pay
attention to and how much attention to pay. Firms’ inability to attend perfectly to
all available information is modeled as a limited cognition behavior, as in Gabaix
(2014). The optimal price depends on the price level, the real aggregate demand,
and an idiosyncratic state variable. The model makes the following predictions. The
responses of prices to shocks can be very sticky. The degree of stickiness in a particular
response depends on the amount of attention allocated to that type of shock. My
approach allows a possibility that prices remain fixed for some time even they can be
reset every period at no physical cost, and the amount of attention allocation can vary.
The reason is that if both aggregate and idiosyncratic conditions are not sufficiently
volatile, firms pay zero attention to both conditions because profit losses from not
paying attention are small in low uncertainty states. Severe inattention generates
inaction in price reset. Moreover, if the idiosyncratic conditions are more variable
10To my knowledge, Baley and Blanco (2017) is the first paper that studies menu cost, information
friction, and idiosyncratic uncertainty jointly.
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than the aggregate conditions, firms attend more to the idiosyncratic conditions than
that to the aggregate conditions. In this case, prices respond strongly and quickly to
idiosyncratic shocks but only weakly and slowly to aggregate shocks. Furthermore,
feedback effects kick in since firms observe endogenous variables such as the price level
and real aggregate demand. When other firms allocate limited attention to aggregate
conditions, the price level reacts less to a nominal shock than in the absence of
bounded rationality. If prices are strategic complements, this implies that each firm
has even less incentive to allocate attention to aggregate conditions. The price level
reacts even less to a nominal shock, and so on. Given the structure of the model,
it can help explain and understand the large average absolute size of price changes
observed in microdata in which prices react fast and by large amounts to idiosyncratic
shocks, but only slowly and by small amounts to nominal shocks. Nominal shocks
can lead to very strong and persistent real effects when the uncertainty of aggregate
condition is very low.
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Chapter 2
Productivity Growth and Returns
2.1 Introduction
This chapter attempts to explain the cross-section of expected stock returns, also
known as the value premium puzzle (Fama and French, 1992, 1993). We first provide
new evidence about the link between firm-level total factor productivity (TFP) gap
and the value premium and then show that a production-based asset pricing model in
which firms have growth options to upgrade their technology to the latest vintage or
not can replicate the empirical relationship between TFP gaps and firm characteris-
tics. Many asset pricing models have used neoclassical asset pricing models to explain
the value premium. In these models, firms with low productivity are more vulner-
able to economic fluctuations so that they are riskier than high productivity firms.
Nonetheless, except Imrohoroglu and Tuzel (2014), no paper has estimated firm-level
productivity and studied the connections between TFP, firm characteristics, and firm
returns directly.
In this chapter, we estimate firm-level total factor productivity (TFP) gap and
provide new evidence about the origins of return variation in the cross-section. The
TFP gap of a firm is the TFP level of a firm relative to that of its industry frontier. We
find that the TFP gap constructed is strongly connected to the book-to-market ratio.
We observe that the TFP gap is positively and monotonically connected to yearly
book-to-market ratios. We show that a production-based asset pricing model in which
firms have growth options to upgrade their technology to the latest vintage or not can
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replicate the empirical relationship between TFP gaps and firm characteristics. All
in all, our results suggest an explanation of why the book-to-market ratio explains
the cross-section of stock returns.
We construct firm-level TFP gap of a firm by subtracting its firm-level TFP level
from its corresponding industry frontier TFP level. We follow the semi-parametric
procedure proposed by Olley and Pakes (1996) to estimate firm-level TFP levels and
construct a panel of TFP gaps for publicly traded firms in the United States using
Compustat Fundamental Annual dataset. We establish the empirical facts about
book-to-market ratio by investigating its statistics sorted by TFP gaps into 10 port-
folios between 1963 to 2016, and by running a fixed effect panel regression analysis.
We observed that the constructed TFP gaps are statistically significantly related to
book-to-market ratio after controlling for a typical set of firm-level characteristics.
Large TFP gap firms are value firms with an average book-to-market ratio of about
0.5, and small TFP gap firms are growth firms with an average book-to-market ratio
below 0.3. The relationship is monotonic across deciles. We find the relationship
between firm book-to-market ratio and TFP to be similarly monotonic decreasing
across deciles. In panel regressions of the book-to-market ratio against the TFP
gap with a set of firm-level controls, firm-fixed, and year-fixed effects, we show that
the coefficient of the TFP gap is positive and statistically significant across different
specifications.
The empirical facts suggest that firms that are relatively far from the technology
frontier are higher in book-to-market ratio. That is, they are value firms. To interpret
our empirical results, we use a production-based asset pricing model following from
Hang (2020) with simplification. We simulate the model with reasonably calibrated
moments and find that it can realize the empirical relationship between the TFP
gap, book-to-market ratio, and can make predictions about the cross-section of stock
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returns.
Specifically, the production-based asset pricing model incorporates the mechanism
of productivity is improved or gained through accumulating experience in the manner
of Arrow (1962). The modeled productivity improvement by proposing that firms
gain experience while using their technology, thereby increasing productivity over
time. The experience curve is modeled as a function of the age of the technology
which is non-decreasing, concave, and bounded above. Therefore, as the technology
ages, the firm becomes more efficient in producing output and will reach full capacity
eventually. Firms are allowed to upgrade their technology to the latest vintage.
However, technology upgrade is costly because the firm gives up the experience they
have already accumulated from the previous technology. Therefore, the firms solve
an optimal stopping problem, in which they decide an optimal time to upgrade the
technology.
The model implies that firms that are characterized by high productivity im-
provement rate, and outdated technology are more likely to upgrade technology. The
intuition is that first, with a high productivity improvement rate, firms can reach
the full capacity of the upgraded technology faster, thus making the transition from
outdated technology to the latest technology more quickly. Second, firms with rela-
tively old technology are more likely to upgrade technology than firms with frontier
technology because the latest technology raises productivity levels in the long-run.
The model also implies that firms that are more likely to innovate earlier are
more exposed to shocks to frontier technology because they tend to keep track of the
frontier by getting closer to it. Since the market price of risk is negative for shocks
to frontier technology, these firms earn a lower risk premium. Therefore, variation
in expected stock returns is closely associated with a firm’s productivity gap in the
model. Further, the asset composition of these firms loads more on growth options
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as opposed to asset-in-place and hence giving them an interpretation that is related
to the ‘growth firms’ in the asset pricing literature.
This chapter connects to the literature that tries to explain the value premium
puzzle (Fama and French, 1992, 1993) in which firms with a high book-to-market
ratio (‘value’ firms) earns a higher return than firms with low book-to-market ratio
(‘growth’ firms) on average. Berk et al. (1999) is the first work investigates the
connection between the value premium and asset composition. They argue that
growth firms exhibit relatively more safe ‘assets-in-place’ which generates cash flow
at the present, and value firms have ‘risky growth options’ which generates positive
NPV in the future (see also Carlson et al. (2004) and Gomes et al. (2003)). More
recent literature proposed that growth firms have growth options that are relatively
less risky and hence charging a smaller risk premium (see Zhang (2005), Ai and Kiku
(2016) and Arnold et al. (2013)). In our hypothesis, firms that upgrade technology
earlier exhibit relatively more growth options and keep tracking the frontier by closing
the TFP gaps, are more exposed to frontier technology shocks, but earn a lower risk
premium, since the price of frontier technology shocks is assumed to be negative.
The rest of the chapter is as follows. Section 2.2 presents empirical results. In
section 2.3, we present an asset pricing model with an experience curve and technology
upgrades. We analyze the model analytically and discuss the main mechanism and
the intuition. Finally, section 2.4 concludes.
2.2 Empirical results
In this section, we present empirical evidence to support that firms that are relatively
far from the technology frontier are higher in book-to-market ratio. The ratio is
a proxy to indicate whether a firm is a value firm or a growth firm. A high ratio
indicates the firm is a value firm, whereas a low ratio indicates the firm is a growth
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firm. We assume that early innovators are relatively close to the technology frontier,
and are more likely to close the technology gap. This implies when we observe a
firm that is relatively far from the technology frontier at a point in time, then it is
a late innovator. We start this section by summarizing the data and the estimation
of the TFP gap. Then, we study the empirical links between the TFP gap and the
book-to-market ratio.
2.2.1 Data
The main composition for constructing the firm-level TFP gap are the firm-level
TFP and the corresponding industry TFP frontier. The frontier is constructed as
the maximum TFP level of all the firms within the industry. To estimate TFP, we
typically rely on the structural estimation of a production function. The main observ-
ables for estimating the firm-level TFP from a production function are the firm-level
value-added, employment, and capital. We use firm-level data from Compustat Fun-
damental Annual, aggregate deflators from the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA)
National Income and Product Accounts (NIPA), and wage data from the Social Se-
curity Administration (SSA). The sample is an unbalanced panel with approximately
12,203 distinct firms across the years between 1963 and 2016. The main variables are
firm-level capital, kit proxied by gross plant, property, and equipment (PPEGT) from
Compustat, deflated by investment deflator from BEA, and the labor lit given by the
number of employees (EMP) from Compustat. We construct firm-level value-added
using Compustat data on sales, operating income, and employees. We then deflate it
using the output deflator.
We measure the contemporaneous ratios over the same horizon as TFPs, matching
by fiscal year (FYEAR) from Compustat. The method is described as follow:
• Market Value: product of the close market price at the fiscal year-end (PRCC F)
times the shares outstanding (CSHO).
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• Book value: stockholders’ equity (SEQ) + deferred taxes (txdb)+ investment
tax credit (itcb) - Preferred Stock.
• Preferred Stock: redemption (pstkrv), liquidation (pstkl), or par value (pstk)(in
that order) were used to estimate depending on availability.
• If Stockholders’ equity is not available, stockholders’ equity was measured by
the book value of common equity plus the par value of the preferred stock, or
the book value of assets minus total liabilities (in that order).
2.2.2 TFP gaps
We start by constructing a proxy for the frontier technology for each industry in each
year. TFP is defined as a measure of the overall effectiveness with which capital and
labor are utilized in a production process. We apply the semiparametric procedure
suggested by Olley and Pakes (1996) to obtain estimates of TFP from the following
equation with variables in natural logs:
t̂fpit = yit − β̂0 − β̂llit − β̂kkit, (2.1)
where yit is the logarithm of value-added for firm i in time t. lit and kit are the
logarithm values of labor and capital of the firm, respectively. The main benefit of this
method over more traditional estimation techniques such as the ordinary least squares
(OLS) is its ability to resolve selection and simultaneity biases and deal with the
within-firm serial correlation in productivity that affects many production function
estimates. Note that the estimation used industry-specific time dummies so that free
of the effect of industry or aggregate TFP in any given year. The production function
parameters are estimated every year using an expanding window procedure so that all
data available up until that year is used. This avoids forward bias. We estimate TFP
for every year between 1963 and 2016 using that year’s data and the corresponding
36
production function estimates for that year. The estimates for the coefficients are
very stable over time and the are similar to those estimated by Imrohoroglu and Tuzel
(2014), even though we have six more recent years. We also check the sensitivity of
the estimates to a number of alternative specifications summarized in their online
appendix.
After estimating the firm-level TFP, the proxy for frontier technology is computed
as the maximum of TFP in each industry in each year. We subtract the TFP of each
firm in each year from the proxy to obtain the TFP gap from the frontier technology.
To classify industries, we attempted two different ways, either SIC-4-digit and Fama-
French-48 industries. We will present both results from these two classifications.
2.2.3 TFP gap and book-to-market ratio
Table 2.1 and 2.2 provide the summary statistics and several firm characteristics over
the sample from 1963 to 2016 with TFP gaps constructed by SIC-4-digit and Fama-
French-48 industry classification, respectively. BM is the book-to-market ratio, book
value divided by market value constructed using procedures discussed in the Data
section 2.2.1. TFP and GAP are the firm-level TFP and the TFP gap, respectively,
constructed using the procedures described in Section 2.2.2. SIZE is the natural
logarithm of total assets in $ million. EMP is the natural logarithm of the number of
employees. LEV is the leverage ratio, the ratio of total debt to the market value of
equity. RDI is the R&D intensity, the research and development expenditures over
sales. ADI is the advertising intensity, advertising expenses over sales. ROA is the
return on assets, the net income divided by total assets. ROE is the return on equity,
the net income divided by book equity. GPR is the gross profits divided by total





















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































To examine whether there exists a relationship between how far the firm’s produc-
tivity from the frontier and its book-to-market ratio, we present the book-to-market
ratios, form 10-bins portfolios sorted on TFP gaps over the sample from 1963 to
2016. For each variables, averages are first taken over all firms in that portfolio, and
then take the time average. Both the TFP gap and the book-to-market ratio are
winsorized at their 0.5 percentile and 95.5 percentile, respectively. Figure 2·1 and 2·2
both suggest that firms that are relatively far from the technology frontier are higher
in book-to-market ratio. Specifically, large TFP gap firms are value firms with an
average book-to-market ratio of about 0.5, whereas small TFP gap firms are growth
firms with an average book-to-market ratio below 0.3. The large TFP gap portfolio
produces approximately 0.2 in book-to-market ratio differential above the small TFP
gap portfolio using either SIC-4-digit or Fama-French-48 industry classifications.
Figure 2·1: Portfolio sorted on TFP gaps (SIC-4-digit industries)
Figure 2·3 and 2·4 shows the same differential from the scatter plots of the book-
to-market ratio against the TFP gap values in the bins. The x-axes are the values
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Figure 2·2: Portfolio sorted on TFP gaps (Fama-French-48 industries)
of the TFP gap in the bin. Results in these figures indicate a strongly monotonic
Figure 2·3: Scatter sorted on TFP gaps (SIC-4-digit industries)
relationship between the TFP gap and the book-to-market ratio of firms.
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Figure 2·4: Scatter sorted on TFP gaps (Fama-French-48 industries)
Bin sorting is a graphical approach. To test the relationship statistically, we run
panel regressions. Specifically, we run the following panel regression with firm-fixed
and year-fixed effects:
BMit = β(GAPit) + γXit + fi + λt + εit, (2.2)
where BMit is the book-to-market ratio, GAPit is the TFP gap, Xit is the firm level
controls, εit is the disturbance of firm i at year t. fi and λt control the firm-fixed and
time fixed effects, respectively.
Table 2.3 shows the regression results. Columns (1) to (3) construct the TFP gap
using SIC-4-digit industry classification (SIC), whereas columns (4) to (6) construct
the TFP gap using Fama-French-48 industry classification (FF48). All the specifica-
tions show that the coefficient of the TFP gap is positive and statistically significant.
The coefficient is also quite stable across specifications.
With the assumption that early innovators are relatively close to the technology
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(1) SIC (2) SIC (3) SIC (4) FF48 (5) FF48 (6) FF48
GAP 0.316∗∗∗ 0.233∗∗∗ 0.215∗∗∗ 0.343∗∗∗ 0.263∗∗∗ 0.233∗∗∗
(0.016) (0.016) (0.018) (0.017) (0.015) (0.021)
SIZE 0.076∗∗∗ 0.030 0.043 0.084∗∗∗ 0.053∗∗ 0.061∗
(0.010) (0.018) (0.027) (0.010) (0.018) (0.028)
EMP 0.002 −0.011 −0.015 −0.028
(0.014) (0.026) (0.014) (0.027)
LEV 0.000∗∗ 0.000∗ 0.000∗∗ 0.000∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
ROA −0.322∗ −0.526∗∗∗ −0.300∗ −0.504∗∗∗
(0.137) (0.086) (0.129) (0.082)
ROE 0.000∗∗∗ 0.002∗ 0.000∗∗∗ 0.002∗
(0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001)
GPR −0.554∗∗∗ −0.419∗∗∗ −0.510∗∗∗ −0.387∗∗∗





R2 0.037 0.061 0.068 0.043 0.064 0.070
Adj. R2 -0.066 -0.040 -0.087 -0.059 -0.036 -0.085
Num. obs. 126988 126617 33214 125317 124957 32889
∗∗∗p < 0.001, ∗∗p < 0.01, ∗p < 0.05. All standard errors are robust standard errors, firm-clustered and
time-clustered. GAP is the TFP gap. SIZE is the natural logarithm of total assets in $ million. EMP is
the natural logarithm of the number of employees. LEV is the leverage ratio, the ratio of total debt to the
market value of equity. ROA is the return on assets, the net income divided by total assets. ROE is the
return on equity, the net income divided by book equity. GPR is the gross profits divided by total assets.
RDI is the R&D intensity, the research and development expenditures over sales. ADI is the advertising
intensity, advertising expenses over sales.
Table 2.3: Panel regression models
frontier, and are more likely to close the technology gap, we find strong statistical
evidence to support that early innovators are growth (low book-to-market ratio) firms,
whereas late innovators are value (low book-to-market ratio) firms. This means early
innovators yield lower expected stock returns than that of the late innovators. This
consistent with the intuition that those firms that closely follow the frontier are more
exposed to the frontier technology shock which has a negative price of risk.
2.3 Model
The empirical facts suggest that firms that are relatively far from the technology fron-
tier are higher in book-to-market ratio. That is, they are value firms. To interpret the
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empirical results, we use a production-based asset pricing model following from Hang
(2020) with simplification to describe the mechanism of productivity improvement
and technology upgrades. It provides a creative destruction mechanism to growth
and innovation.
2.3.1 Environment
The economy consists of a continuum of firms, indexed by i. They produce an identical
product, which delivers a perpetual stream of cash flows Xt. Therefore, we assume
that Xt and consumption is positively correlated. The firm takes the cash flow and
productivity processes as given, then the flow of output is
Yt = QtXt = AτEt−τXt = AτXt(1− ρe−λ(t−τ)). (2.3)
Firm is heterogeneous in productivity levels and their corresponding improvement
rates. This assumption is similar to the assumption used in Gârleanu et al. (2012b)
and Eisfeldt and Papanikolaou (2013). The productivity levels depend indirectly on
the frontier technology level, similar to Eisfeldt and Papanikolaou (2013). Qit is the
productivity of firm i at time t. The productivity level of firm i is a product of
technology, Aτi, that firm i has been using since τ and the experience level, Ei,t−τi.
τi ≤ t is the time when firm i upgraded its previous version of technology to the
existing one, and t− τi is the age of firm i’s technology. The experience curve depicts
how much experience firm i has accumulated since its last technology upgrade, Aτi ,
at time τi. For the remaining of the chapter, we simplify our notations by dropping
the index i unless necessary.




= gdt+ σdWXt , (2.4)
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where g > 0 and σ are the local mean and local volatility of the growth rate of cash
flow, respectively, and WXt is standard Brownian motion.







where µA > 0 and σA denote the local mean and local variance of the frontier tech-
nological growth, respectively, and dWAt is a standard Brownian motion under the
physical measure and is independent of dWXt . As in Gârleanu et al. (2012a), Gârleanu
et al. (2012b), and Eisfeldt and Papanikolaou (2013), there is exogenous technological
progress in the economy. In these models, the latest technology is only ‘embodied’ in
the latest capital vintages. The firm with technology Aτ is allowed to upgrade it to
the latest technology At.
The firms take the stochastic discount factor as given. It is an exogenous geometric
Brownian motion with two sources of risks:
dπt
πt
= −rfdt− γXdWXt − γAdWAt , (2.6)
where rf denotes the risk-free rate, and γX and γA denote the price of risk for a shock
to cash flow Xt and the price of risk for a shock to the level of frontier technology At,
respectively.
2.3.2 Firm’s optimization problem
Each firm maximizes the expected value of net present value of discounted future cash
flows by selecting the optimal time T to upgrade the existing technology vintage to
the frontier:










V̄ (XT , AT )
 , (2.7)
44
where V (Xt, Aτ , At, t − τ) denotes the value function. The state variables at time t
are the level of cash flow, Xt, the level of existing technology, Aτ , the level of frontier
technology, At, and the age of existing technology, t− τ . And V̄ (XT , AT ) denotes the
value of the option to upgrade technology AT at time T . Intuitively, the first term is
independent of the frontier because it only prices the existing assets-in-place. On the
other hand, the extra risk arises from the uncertainty in the frontier technology.
2.3.3 The micro implications of optimality
Each firm chooses the optimal stopping time, T , to maximizes its present value.
Therefore, at any point in time, the firm chooses whether to continue to use the
existing technology and to receive an instantaneous payoff AτEt−τXt, or exercise the
option to upgrade the technology to the latest, thereby gaining the value of the option
exercised. The value of the option is increasing in At. Therefore, there exists a cut-off
Ā such that if At ≥ Ā, the firm will optimally upgrade the technology because as
the level of the frontier technology, At, is approaching a higher level relative to the
existing vintage, Aτ , even the firm has accumulated plenty of experience, the firm’s
technology will be outdated as the frontier technology improves. Hence, the benefit
for the firm to upgrade is larger as the technology gap between At and Aτ diverges.
Therefore, the equivalent goal of the firm is to search for a policy Ā that maximizes
the present value of the discounted of future cash flows.
The cut-off divides the state space into two regions: (1) ’exercise region’, At ≥ Ā,
the firm upgrades the technology, and (2) ’inaction region’, At < Ā, in which the
firm continues to use its existing technology from its last upgrade. If At reaches the
cut-off Ā, the firm is willing to upgrade the technology.
From the solution of the optimal stopping time problem, the cut-off Ā is
1. increasing in the firm’s existing technology,
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2. increasing in α, which summarizes the state of the economy in terms of the
model parameters,
3. increasing in ρ, which implies that firms with high opportunity cost to forgo
experience, ρ, will upgrade later than firms with low opportunity cost,
4. decreasing in λ, for λ > λ∗, implying that firms upgrade earlier with high speed
of productivity improvement, for some λ∗ > 0.
For At < Ā, the value of the firm is
V (Xt, Aτ , At, t− τ) = V A (Xt, Aτ , t− τ) + V G (Xt, Aτ , At, t− τ) , (2.8)
where V A denotes the value of assets-in-place, and V G denotes the value of the growth
option, given respectively by:
















r − g + λ
e−λ(t−τ)
)
[A∗ (At, t− τ)]αA1−ατ
Two observations can be obtained from the solution. First, the solution suggests the
total value of the firm can be decomposed into two categories of assets: assets-in-place
and growth options. Clearly, the assets-in-place only depends on the firm’s existing
vintage upgraded last time, and is independent of frontier technology. In contrast,
the value of the growth option depends on the frontier technology.
Second, the model allows one to connect the firm’s productivity improvement
mechanism to its asset composition. In particular, denote wA the weight of the firm
that loads on assets-in-place, and wG = 1 − wA the weight loads on growth options,
respectively, then
1 = wA + wG =
V A (Xt, Aτ , t− τ)
V (Xt, Aτ , At, t− τ)
+
V G (Xt, At, t− τ)
V (Xt, Aτ , At, t− τ)
(2.9)
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The solution suggests that V G is increasing in A∗ and decreasing in Aτ . The model
implies that firms with large divergence from the frontier level of technology (low
Aτ.i), recently upgraded (low t − τi), low opportunity costs of giving up experience
(low ρi), and firms that can accumulate experience quickly (high λi) load relatively
more on growth options, and will more likely to upgrade and earlier. Therefore, they
are the early innovator.
2.3.4 The micro implications of the value of growth
The value of the growth option is given by: V (Xt, Aτ , At, t− τ)−V A (Xt, Aτ , At, t− τ).
The firm’s value function satisfies:

























if At ≥ Ā
(2.10)
Then, the value of the growth option is:


































Before exercising, the growth option is increasing in the level of the frontier technology.
Then, as At → 0, the growth option has no value. After upgrading technology, the
option value is a function t− τ . The value of the option value is negatively correlated
with how recent of the previous upgrade. The higher the t−τ , the more the experience
accumulated, causing the firm more reluctant to upgrade its technology.
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2.3.5 Returns, where both the macro and micro implications matters
The model has two exogenous stochastic processes, Xt and At. The solution suggests
Xt affects the level of the value of the firm, while At affects the value of the growth
option. The growth option in turn depends on the firm’s experience accumulated.
The returns to investors are described as follow: The process of the actual excess






























with A∗i given by































= (σXγX + σAγAβi,A) dt (2.15)
Rearranging terms, one can also represent the actual excess return by decomposing















This shows that the return of the firm is exposed to two shocks: the shock to cash
flow, dZXt , and the shock to the level of frontier technology, dZ
A
t . As all firms produce
an identical final good, the shocks in X affects all firms identically. Therefore, the
cross-section of actual return is associated with the firm’s exposure to the shocks to
the frontier technology captured by the second term. Specifically, the exposure to
frontier technology risk is increasing in the cut-off function A∗ (t− τ, At).
In general equilibrium, the expected return is determined by the covariance of the
negative of the stochastic discount factor and the actual return. The expected return,
expression (2.15), captures the relationship between the overall risk premia and both
the risk premia for cash flow and the risk premia for frontier technology. In the first
term, σXγX is the risk premium on cash flow, as affected by both the quantity of
risk σX and the price of risk γX . The shock to cash flow is typically assume to be
positively correlated with consumption shock, and hence the price of cash flow risk is
positive (see, for instance, Papanikolaou (2011)).
The second term captures all the cross-section variation in expected return. σAγA
is the expected excess return on a portfolio that is fully exposed to the frontier tech-
nological shock. Papanikolaou (2011) finds that a positive shock to investment has
a negative risk premium. Moreover, Eisfeldt and Papanikolaou (2013) find that the
shock to frontier technology has a negative price of risk. Further, from GMM esti-
mation of their model, the risk premium of frontier technology is negative, Finally,
innovation shocks in Gârleanu et al. (2012b) also has a negative premium. The model
presented here has a creative destruction interpretation. If firms upgrade their tech-
nology to replace their current vintage, the experience accumulated is destroyed and
is reset to the initial level of experience E0 = 1− ρ since the technology is new to the
firms. In a general equilibrium of view, the destruction is unfavourable and costly
to labors, as their previously trained skills become outdated, and as their experience
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is reset to E0, they need to be trained again to acquire new skills to operate the
latest technology. This interpretation has the same flavor as the displacement risk as
in Gârleanu et al. (2012b). For these reasons, in macro sense, we take the assump-
tion that the frontier technological shock is negatively correlated with consumption
shock, and positively correlated with investment shock, that is, γA < 0, the frontier
technological shock has a negative price of risk. Indeed, the New Keynesian frame-
work of macroeconomics also favors the assumption that technology improvements
are contractionary.
The expected return expression (2.15) indicates an asset pricing model can be
represented by the following linear factor form:
E [Ri − rf ] = βi,XσXγX + βi,AσAγA
= βi,XE [RX − rf ] + βi,AE [RA − rf ] (2.17)
where βi,X = 1 for any firm i, and βi,A is heterogeneous across firms given by equation
(2.13). Therefore, firm i’s exposure to the frontier technological shock At is increasing
in the function A∗i (t− τi, At) and decreasing in its existing technology vintage, Aτi .
First, consider the extreme situation where firm’s existing vintage is more advanced
than the frontier. Notice that this firm’s threshold Ā is linear in the its own tech-
nology, and hence extremely high. In this situation, it requires a long time for the
frontier technology to exceed the firm’s existing technology. Then, this firm’s mainly
loads weights on assets-in-place, and is insensitive to a movement in the frontier tech-
nology, and therefore has a low βi,A. Second, A
∗
i , is heterogeneous in all firms. Recall
this function is increasing in λi > λ
∗ for some λ∗ and decreasing in how recent the
existing technology t−τi upgraded last time. In words, firms with higher productivity
improvement rates have larger exposure to frontier shocks than those accumulating
experience in slower rates. Intuitively, since these firms approach full capacity earlier,
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and the benefits of improving marginal productivity is lower than that of upgrading
their technology. Third, firms with older technology tend to upgrade later because
these firms have already accumulated more experience from the last reset. Finally,
recall the impact of ρ is ambiguous on A∗i and depends on whether e
−λ(t−τ) is larger
or less than 1. Nevertheless, because λ > 0, A∗ is always decreasing in ρ. Therefore,
firms with lower opportunity costs to forgo experience have higher exposure to the
frontier technological shock implying that they are more willing and likely to upgrade
their current technology.
In sum, the model implies there are four characteristics that explain heterogeneity
in the risk premia: (1) how recent the firm’s upgrade since last time, t − τi, (2) the
productivity improvement rate λ, (3) the opportunity of experience forgone due to
upgrade ρi and (4) the divergence between the firm’s existing technology Aτi relative
to the frontier. The model suggests that firms with outdated technology (low Aτ,i),
recently upgraded (low t− τi), firms with low opportunity costs of experience forgone
(low ρ), and firms that can improve productivity quickly (high λ) are more exposed
to the frontier technological shock. Investing in these firms earns a low risk premium
since the shocks to frontier technology have a negative price of risk.
2.3.6 Simulation results
In the previous section, we have only delivered the analytical implications of the
model. We attempt to provide the simulation results to evaluate the model’s implica-
tion on the value premium quantitatively. The simulation procedures are discussed in
Hang (2020). To examine whether the model is able to resolve the value premium puz-
zle, one need to construct model implied annual returns, form 10-bins value-weighted
portfolios sorted on price-to-earning ratios, and then take the time average. Figure
2·5 suggests that the model is able to explain the value premium. Specifically, the
value portfolio produces 2% annual return in excess of growth portfolio.
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Figure 2·5: Portfolio sorted on price-to-earnings ratios
2.4 Conclusion
We investigated the asset pricing implications of technology innovation and produc-
tivity improvement. We present new evidence about the link between firm-level total
factor productivity (TFP) gap and the value premium. We estimate the firm-level
TFP gap and show that it is strongly correlated to firm-level book-to-market ra-
tio. Our empirical evidence supports that small productivity gap firms exhibit a low
book-to-market ratio, that is, they are growth firms, and vice versa. We assume these
firms are early innovators and likely to keep track of the technological frontier more
closely and therefore expose more to the frontier risk. We show that a production-
based asset pricing model with a creative destruction mechanism in which firms have
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growth options to upgrade their technology to the latest vintage or not can replicate
the empirical relationship between TFP gaps and firm characteristics. The model im-
plies that firms with lower opportunity costs to innovate are more likely to innovate.
Moreover, such firms rely more on growth options and are more exposed to produc-
tivity shocks. If the shocks bear a negative price of risk, meaning technology improves
during the course of a recession, then such firms yield relatively low expected returns.
Holding such firms in a portfolio hedge against bad times.
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Chapter 3
Firm Dynamics with Firm-specific
Intangible Capital
3.1 Introduction
Simple neoclassical models of firm investment under uncertainty lack an internal
mechanism to propagate shocks because factor demands are determined by static
conditions such that the factor prices and their corresponding marginal products are
equalized, respectively. As a result, these models cannot generate hump-shaped re-
sponses. To generate hump-shaped responses, a typical model usually incorporates
an intertemporal channel that allows to trade-off current period profit for future pe-
riod profit. Would a production process with dependence on firm-specific intangible
capital be able to generate internal propagation in macroeconomics? If so, how do
different degrees of dependence on firm-specific intangible capital affect firm dynam-
ics? These questions can be interesting because the share of intangible capital relative
the tangible capital has been rising over time during the past few decades, and the
intangible capital is also an important driver of economic growth in the long-run.
Firm-specific intangible capital within any particular firm, by its own nature, has no
value to other firms because they are not tradeable. Since the market for this type
of capital does not exist, it can only be internally created and accumulated within
firms over time. Because of this property, building up intangible capital is crucially
essential to production in the future, in which firms take time to produce their in-
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tangible capital, and this process affects the cross-section of allocation of intangible
capital and tangible capital.
I find that theoretically, firms that are characterized by a higher factor share of
intangible capital are able to generate a stronger degree of hump-shaped impulse
responses of output even without explicitly adding an adjustment cost component.
Moreover, producing intangible capital internally within a firm introduces real fric-
tion to a typical simple model, and this embedded mechanism can be an alternative
micro-foundation of adjustment cost. In addition, the internal intangible capital ac-
cumulation also provides a Q-theory style of firm investment in the sense that the
“Q”, current marginal value of producing one unit of firm-specific intangible capital,
or the price of intangible investment relative to that of the tangible investment is
equal to the present value of the discounted future marginal products of intangible
capital used in producing final output. Furthermore, introducing firm-specific intan-
gible capital also introduces a time-varying wedge between factor prices and marginal
products. Finally, I find that empirically, the impulse response functions of output
at the macro level are also indeed hump-shaped generated by a structural vector au-
toregressive (VAR) model. The VAR model constructed from data in periods with
higher intangible capital shares exhibits a more hump-shaped impulse response with
a more delayed peak.
3.2 Related literature
The neoclassical theory of a firm’s investment decisions implies that capital demand
is determined by the static condition that the marginal product of capital is equal to
the user cost of capital. There is no channel through which expectations about the
future affect investment demand. To modify this theory, Abel (1980, 1982), Hayashi
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(1982), and Summers (1981) developed the Q theory of investment.1 The key role
of the Q theory is that investment incurs convex adjustment costs. The Q summa-
rizes all relevant information about the future profitability of investment, and it is
a sufficient statistics for investment decisions. Despite the popularity and apparent
“necessity” of convex adjustment cost in macro models, few micro-foundations have
been provided in the literature to rationalize convex adjustment cost, especially the
properties imposed on the functional forms of convex adjustment cost. My investment
model developed in this chapter does not require an explicit investment cost compo-
nent to introduce a mechanism through which expectations about the future affect
investment demand. Instead, I proposed the dependence on the internal creation of
firm-specific capital allows firms to trade-off profit flows across time indirectly. Fur-
ther, the intangible capital accumulation also provides a Q style of firm investment
in the sense that the “Q”, the current marginal value of producing one unit of firm-
specific intangible capital, or the price of intangible investment relative to that of the
tangible investment is equal to the present value of the discounted future marginal
products of intangible capital used in producing the final output. There is empiri-
cal evidence that documents irreversibility and lumpiness of investment in the data.
To model this behavior, Abel and Eberly (1994) and Cooper and Haltiwanger (2006)
augment a non-convex adjustment cost component to the convex cost component and
assume the resale price of capital is different from the purchase price. There is also re-
search on how non-convex adjustment costs affect aggregate dynamics. For example,
Caballero and Engel (1999) introduces stochastic fixed adjustment costs to examine
how the extensive margin of investment impacts aggregate dynamics. The model
has appealing aggregation properties and yields nonlinear aggregate time series pro-
cesses. However, Thomas (2002), Khan and Thomas (2003) and Khan and Thomas
1See Lucas (1967), Gould (1968), Uzawa (1969), and Treadway (1969) for early studies of invest-
ment with adjustment costs. For a literature survey on investment theory, see Caballero (1999). For
a textbook treatment, see Dixit and Pindyck (1994)
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(2008) show that when prices are endogenized in a standard RBC framework, the
extensive margin is irrelevant for aggregate dynamics. Winberry (2020) on the other
hand argues that after matching the dynamics of the real interest rate the extensive
margin is relevant for aggregate dynamics. In my model, modeling irreversibility and
lumpiness of investment is not the goal in this chapter. However, the internal creation
of firm-specific capital is a technology constraint that imposes perfect irreversibility
of firm-specific capital because of the non-tradeable nature of this type of capital.
My model is a partial equilibrium model that can be extended easily to a general
equilibrium model by adding standard DSGE components.
Intangible capital is an important driver of an economy. Researchers have been
exploring the importance and the impact of rising intangible capitals for the last
few decades (Corrado et al., 2009; Peters and Taylor, 2017; Crouzet and Eberly,
2019).2 Corrado et al. (2009) suggests that for the US, the investment in intangible
capital was around 12% of GDP between 1998 and 2000. Even though there is
almost no disagreement regarding the importance of intangible investment, its size
within the economy is still not completely settled because of differences in the way it
is defined and measured. Moreover, both microeconomist and macroeconomist have
found evidence there is a significant amount of intangible investment. For example,
Gourio and Rudanko (2014) treat customer capital as a type of intangible capital.
They introduced search frictions to firms in generating long-term customer so that the
customer base is a state variable, which is sluggish to adjust and affects the persistence
of firm-level variables. In Peters and Taylor (2017), they consider intangible capital
as a combination of knowledge capital and organization capital. Specifically, they use
the perpetual inventory method to transform firm-level research and development
(R&D) expenses and selling, general and administrative expense (SG&A) expenses
from income statements into investment flow in knowledge capital and organization
2For one looks for a non-technical book on this topic, seeHaskel and Westlake (2018).
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capital, respectively. In a comparison of physical capital and intangible capital, they
find the latter adjusts more slowly to changes in investment opportunities, and the
classic Q theory performs better in firms and years with more intangible capital.
In the asset pricing literature, Belo et al. (2014) consider brand capital as intangible
capital and proposed a neoclassical investment-based model to match the asset pricing
facts and properties of firm-level investment. Eisfeldt and Papanikolaou (2014, 2013)
provide a valuation method to price organization and human capital at the firm-level.
My work is more related to Peters and Taylor (2017). However, my theoretical model
does not have a convex adjustment cost component to both types of capital. The
intangible capital does adjust more slowly to exogenous shocks compared to physical
capital, which is consistent with what Peters and Taylor (2017) found.
Firm-specific capital is non-tradeable or at least not completely liquid by its own
nature. As Bertola and Caballero (1994) state: “once installed, capital often has little
or no value unless used in production.” The firm-specific nature results in investment
irreversibility (Pindyck, 1991; Bertola and Caballero, 1994; Abel and Eberly, 1996),
and affects price setting and inflation dynamics (Woodford, 2005; Sveen and Weinke,
2005; Altig et al., 2011). The key challenge for studying firm-specific capital and
its implications is measurement. Kermani and Ma (2020) resolve this issue by con-
structing a new dataset that directly accounts for asset specificity for all major asset
types in major industries. They find that assets are highly specific in a majority
of industries, and then study the determinants of asset specificity variations such as
mobility, durability, and customization. They also find that higher asset specificity is
connected to fewer asset sales, greater investment response to uncertainty, and higher
dispersion in Q, consistent with theories of investment irreversibility. My work only
assumes firm-specific nature in intangible capital. Also, I assume that not only the
firms are unable to sell their existing firm-specific intangible capital, they also have to
58
create the intangible capital on their own using another production technology which
requires shifting a fraction of factor inputs in labor, tangible capital, and intangible
capital from the final output production technology.
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 3.3 introduces a theoret-
ical model with firm-specific intangible capital. Section 3.4 displays the theoretical
impulse responses implied by the model. Section 3.5 shows some relevant empirical
data series and the empirical impulse responses implied by a vector autoregressive
econometric model. Finally, section 3.6 concludes the chapter.
3.3 A model with firm-specific intangible capital
I use a dynamic partial equilibrium model where all firms take factor prices as given
and maximize the present value of their real profits subject to their constraints.
3.3.1 Model setups and assumptions
A firm i at period t is represented by two technologies. The first technology produces










where l1,it is labor hours, k
T
1,it is tangible capital, k
I
1,it is intangible capital, and zit is
an productivity shock. The parameter γ1 is the output elasticity of labor, α1 is the
output elasticity of capital, and θ1 specifies the degree of dependence on intangible
capital. If θ1 = 1, then a firm produces final output without intangible capital,
whereas when θ1 = 0, then only intangible capital is demanded in the production of
the final goods.
The firm can use the final output yit for investment, xit, directly in tangible capital,
kTit , which will be available at the start of the next period, then the net final sales
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is yit − xit. This can also be interpreted as selling final output and use part of the
proceed for investment. The net final sales are not constrained to be positive because
the firm can buy output from other firms if it would like to invest in tangible capital
more than it produced or disinvest directly from existing capital. One can imagine
this as equity finance if we were in a world with a household sector.
Given investment, xit, the law of motion of tangible capital follows
kTit+1 = xit + (1− δT )kTit , (3.2)
where δT is the depreciation rate of tangible capital.
The second technology produces firm-specific intangible capital, kIit+1, which will








γ2 + (1− δI)kIit, (3.3)










Then one can view the second technology as the law of motion of internally-produced
firm-specific intangible capital. θ2α2 is the elasticity of tangible capital that is used
in the current period to create intangible capital with respect to intangible capital
in the next period. θ2 = 1 means intangible capital is not used in the creation of
intangible capital, where as θ2 = 0, firm allocates tangible capital only to final output
production and no tangible capital is used in the creation of intangible capital.
The total amount of tangible and intangible capital employed by the firm must












The productivity shock evolves as an autoregressive process of order 1 (AR(1))
with persistence parameter, ρ1, innovation variance, σ1, and the innovation, ε1,it,
follows an standard normal distribution:
z1,it = ρ1z1,it−1 + σ1ε1,it, ε1,it ∼ N (0, 1) (3.7)
The firm’s period profit flows are
dit = y1,it − xit − wt(l1,it + l2,it), (3.8)
where wt is labor wage. Note that there is no explicit adjustment cost subtracted
from the profit flow nor subtraction of intangible capital investment cost from this
flow.3 Therefore, the real friction is coming from the internal production nature of
the intangible capital embedded in the second technological constraint.
3.3.2 Firm optimization
The state variables of the firm are kTit , k
I







it+1, l1,it and l2,it. Since the problem of the firm has a block-recursive






it+1, the choice of l1,it
and l2,it can be obtained directly from the optimality conditions derived from the
production functions and the wage.
In each period, the firm maximizes the present value of its real profits subject to its
production function for output and intangible capital, and other relevant constraints.
3See chapter appendix 3.A.2 for a case with quadratic adjustment cost imposed. And see chapter
appendix 3.A.3 for a case when the firm incurs a direct intangible capital investment cost from its
profit function. In this case, none of the capital types is firm-specific because the firm can purchase
capital directly and does not require the creation of capital using another technology on its own.
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Specifically, for a given discount rate of investors, rt, the value function of the firm is
V (kTit , k
I










subject to (3.8), (3.1), (3.2), (3.3), (3.5), (3.6) and (3.7). That is, the following set of
equations:






























z1,it = ρ1z1,it−1 + σ1ε1,it, ε1,it ∼ N (0, 1)
The presence of the firm-specific intangible capital distinguishes this model from
a typical simple investment model. The firm-specific capital is internally produced

















to denote respectively the fraction of labor, tangible capital and intangible capital,
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which firm allocates to produce the final goods. Thus, the remaining fraction of the
labor, tangible capital and intangible capital, that is, (1− slit), (1− sTit) and (1− sIit)
are used to produce intangible capital internally.






























it+1, z1,it+1)− qit = 0 (3.16)








where qit is the Lagrange multiplier on the second technology constraint (3.3). There
are several interpretation of qit. It is the marginal value of producing or investing in
firm-specific intangible capital. It can be interpreted as the relative price of intangible
investment to tangible investment. In addition, observed from the first two and the
last two first-order conditions, it is the ratios of marginal products of any factor of
the first production technology to that of the corresponding factor from of production
technology.
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Substituting the envelope conditions (3.19) and (3.20) into the first-order con-
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ditions of tangible (3.15) and intangible capital (3.16) respectively results in the




















The first one is the asset pricing equation for tangible capital and the second one is
the asset pricing equation for intangible capital. There are several different ways to
interpret these asset pricing equations.
To interpret the asset pricing equation for tangible capital (3.21), one can say
the expected discounted marginal creation of intangible capital using tangible capital
in the second technology plus the undepreciated tangible capital is one. One can
also combine the earlier definition of sTit, the fraction of tangible capital allocated to
produce final goods, from equation (3.11) and the capital allocation constraint (3.5)










the expected discounted marginal creation of intangible capital using a fraction of
tangible capital allocated to produce intangible capital internally plus the undepre-
ciated tangible capital is one. From the first-order conditions, we observed that the
marginal products of the two production technologies of the same factor are equalized.
Therefore, one can also write the asset claim in terms of final output by substituting
the first-order condition of tangible capital used in final good production (3.13) into













the expected discounted marginal product of using a fraction of tangible capital allo-
cated to produce final goods plus the undepreciated tangible capital is one. Finally,
one can also write this asset pricing equation as a weighted average of marginal fi-
nal product and marginal intangible capital investment weighted by the fractions of



















2,it+1 = (1− sTit+1)kTit+1, then it is a sum














To interpret the asset pricing equation for intangible capital (3.22), one can say
the expected discounted marginal creation of intangible capital using intangible cap-
ital in the second technology plus the undepreciated tangible capital is equal to the
marginal value of producing or investing in intangible capital. Similar to the asset
pricing equation for tangible capital discussed in the previous paragraph, one can
also combine the earlier definition of sIit, the fraction of intangible capital allocated to
produce final goods, from equation (3.12) and the capital allocation constraint (3.6)
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the marginal value of investment is the expected discounted marginal product of
intangible capital used in producing the final output.
3.3.3 Time-varying wedges and intertemporal profit trade-off
Since the model includes internal creation of intangible capital and the firm does not
allocate all labor and capital for final output production, the marginal products of
factors are not equal to the respective factor prices. Instead, in this model, factor
prices will be higher than the marginal products, or the marginal products will be
lower given factor prices. Clearly, in the corner case with the absence of firm-specific
intangible capital, all factors will be used only in the production of the final output.
The first two and the last two first-order conditions suggest that the firm allocates
factors to the creation of intangible capital in a way that a marginal decrease in the
final output offsets the marginal increase in intangible capital available to the firm.
Rearranging (3.24), combining (3.22), (3.14) and (3.12), and combining equation
(3.17), (3.18) and (3.10) gives:





























The above equations show that factor prices and user cost exceed their marginal
product in the final output production. The marginal products differ from the typical
conditions in which the firm will not equate the marginal products to their factor
prices. This is because only a fraction of labor and capital are used in final production,
the remaining fraction is used to produce firm-specific intangible capital which in turn
raises output production and hence profits in the future. Note that the fractions sTit
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and slit act as time-varying wedges between factor prices and marginal products
4. The
production or investment in firm-specific intangible capital with the unit in terms of
output can be represented as follow5:

































The above relationship shows that investment in intangible capital is increasing in
output, decreasing in fractions of factors allocated to final output production, and
decreasing in the implicit price of intangible capital. The presence of firm-specific
intangible capital leads to profit6 as follows:











This means even if the production technology is constant returns to scale, non-zero
economic profit is possible. Substituting equation (3.41) into the profit expression
leads to the following connection between profit and firm-specific intangible invest-
4The wedge between the marginal product of labor and wages in the data is often interpreted
as evidence of monopoly power. In the steady-state, my model would imply a markup greater than
one even though the firm behaves competitively.
5To obtain this representation, I assumed the intangible production technology is constant returns
to scale. Then using the optimality conditions connecting marginal products of factors and factor
prices of the intangible production technology, Euler’s homogeneous function theorem implies the
representation
6This definition of profit is as if the economy has a household sector renting tangible capital to the
firms directly. One can link this profit to dividend defined earlier by πit = dit− (rt−1 + δT )kTit +xit.
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ment:
πit = α1(1− θ1)
1
sIit









The second equality uses the first-order condition (3.14), fraction definition (3.12)
and the allocation constraint (3.6). The expression above shows a trade-off between
current period profit and internal investment in firm-specific intangible capital. This
expression has a very interesting interpretation: the first term is the profit gain in
producing y1,it units of the final output, or equivalently, y2,it units of intangible capital
using intangible capital. From the user cost condition (3.37), this is also the total
user cost saved qit−1
(
(rt−1 + δI)− ∆qitqit−1 (1− δI)
)
kIit because the firm does not need
to or cannot purchase it from other parties. It can only produce the firm-specific
intangible capital internally. The second term is the total implicit cost of producing
y2,it units of the intangible capital.
3.3.4 Steady-state and its comparative static analysis
In the deterministic steady-state, all variables are time-invariant. That is for any
variable Xt, Xt+1 = Xt for all t. The investment rate of each type of capital is equal






The marginal products cross technologies of a particular factor is equalized in terms






















The factor price and user cost conditions in the steady-state implies:












The fractions of factor allocated to final output production technology are also con-


























The steady-state of these fractions can be solved analytically in terms of the model
parameters. To show this, combine equation (3.49) with (3.52) and substitute out y2
using equation (3.47) gives:




Once we obtain sI , one can combine equations (3.48) and (3.49) to obtain sT , and




















































We observe that in the steady-state, the fraction of intangible capital allocated
to the final output production, sI , is (i) increasing in the discount rate or the return
to capital, r, because the user cost of intangible capital used to create intangible
capital is relatively more expensive, and the firm will shift intangible capital input
from intangible capital creation to final good production according to the equivalent
optimality condition r+ δI =
α2(1−θ2)δI
1−sI , where I used the steady condition (3.47); (ii)
decreasing in the intangible capital depreciation rate, δI , because the cost of using
intangible is higher; and (iii) decreasing in the elasticity of intangible capital that
is used in the current period to create intangible capital with respect to intangible
capital for the next period, α2(1− θ2). The intuition behind why sI is decreasing in
elasticity is that the higher the degree of dependence of using both types of capital in
producing intangible capital (higher α2) and the higher the degree of dependence of
using intangible capital in producing intangible capital (higher 1−θ2), then the higher
the marginal intangible capital creation using an extra unit of intangible capital. A
higher fraction of intangible capital in the current period will be allocated to produce
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intangible capital for the next period so that the fraction allocated to good production
will be lower. It is interesting to see that the steady-state fraction of intangible capital
allocated to either the final output production or intangible creation is independent
of α1, θ1, γ1, γ2, δT and w.
7
Next, the fraction of tangible capital allocated to the final output production,
sT , is (i) increasing in the fraction of intangible capital allocated to the final output
production, sI , because this is similar to a positive capital-augmented productivity
improvement; (ii) increasing in the degree of dependence of using tangible capital in
the final output production, θ1, because the firm has a higher marginal product using
an extra unit of tangible capital; and (iii) decreasing in the degree of dependence of
using tangible capital in the intangible capital creation, θ2, because the firm needs to
shift a fraction of tangible capital to produce intangible capital with higher marginal
intangible capital creation using an extra unit of tangible capital. It is interesting
to see that the steady-state fraction of tangible capital allocated to either the final
output production or intangible creation is independent of α1, γ1, γ2, δT and w.
Finally, the fraction of labor allocated to the final output production, sl, is (i)
increasing in either the fraction of intangible or intangible capital allocated to the
final output production, sI or sT , respectively because this is similar to a positive
productivity improvement; (ii) increasing in the degree of dependence of using labor
in the final output production, γ1, because the firm has a higher marginal product
labor; (iii) decreasing in the degree of dependence of using labor in the intangible
capital creation, γ2, because the firm needs to shift a fraction of labor to produce
intangible capital with higher marginal intangible capital creation using an extra unit
of labor; (iv) decreasing in the degree of dependence of using intangible capital in the
output production, α1(1−θ1), because intangible capital is relatively more productive
given factor prices; and (v) decreasing in the degree of dependence of using intangible
7This only true for the fraction rather than the level of intangible capital.
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capital in the intangible capital creation, α2(1 − θ2), because intangible capital is
relatively more productive in creating intangible capital and the firm will shift the
allocation of intangible capital from final output production to intangible capital
creation, which in term decreases the marginal product of labor for final output. It is
interesting to see that the steady-state fraction of labor allocated to either the final
output production or intangible creation is independent of δT and w.
Once we solved for sT , sI and sl one can use the factor price optimality condition
(3.51), (3.52) and (3.53) to solve for the ratios of output-tangible capital, output-




































The factor shares of income are higher than that of a model setting without intangible
capital because, in addition to final good production, factors can also be used to create
intangible capital, which in term can be used to produce output. Notice at a first
glance, it seems that the sum of factor income shares is greater than one. However,
this is not the case because the firm creates intangible capital internally, and there
is no rent or price paid to hire intangible capital as shown in equation (3.42). This
means the intangible capital share of income is an implicit measure only. Indeed, one
can imagine this proportion of income is retained by the firm.











1 + r/δI − α2(1− θ2)
(3.65)
Clearly, the steady-state intangible investment to output ratio is (i) decreasing in, sI ,
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because a higher fraction of intangible capital is allocated to produce final good; (ii)
increasing in α1(1− θ1) because the marginal product of intangible capital is higher;
and (iii) decreasing in α2(1− θ2) because the marginal intangible capital creation of
intangible capital is higher.
From the law of motion of firm-specific capital (3.3), we can obtain the following













This expression can be used to eliminate kI in the final good production technology.
As tangible capital to output ratio is already determined, the expression can be used
to find tangible capital as a function of labor in the steady-state using factor share
of income expressions (3.62), (3.63), or (3.64). Solving these simultaneous equations
yields the solution of kT and l analytically. Once the output is determined, tangible
capital can be obtained, and one can solve for output, y1, tangible capital investment,
x, intangible capital investment, y2, and the marginal value of intangible investment,
q.
3.3.5 Dynamic stochastic model solution
I use perturbation methods discussed in Fernández-villaverde and Rubio-ramı́rez
(2006) and Fernández-Villaverde et al. (2016) to solve the dynamic stochastic model.
The system of equation that characterize the dynamic system of the firm can be can
be further reduced. Using the production technologies (3.1), and (3.4) and the frac-







kI2,it, l1,it and l2,it in optimality conditions (3.13), (3.14), (3.17), (3.18) (3.21), and
(3.22), together with (3.2) and (3.3), one can reduce the system to eight equations in











The dynamic system has 11 parameters, namely θ1, α1, γ1, γ2, θ2, α2, γ2, δT , δI , ρ1
and σ1. The calibration exercise uses data from the period of 1987Q2 to 2019Q4.
Accounted from National Income and Product Accounts (NIPA) table, I set the out-
put elasticity of labor in technology 1 at γ1 = 0.6 to match 60% of labor share of
income. The output elasticity of capital in technology 1 is accounted as α1 = 0.4
to match 40% of capital share of income. The capital elasticity of tangible capital
in technology 1 is accounted as θ1 = 0.625 to match 25% of tangible capital share
of income.8 The capital elasticity of tangible capital in technology 2 is accounted as
θ2 = 0.64 to match 0.27 of average intangible to tangible investment ratio within the
period. The output elasticity of capital in technology 2 is accounted as α2 = 0.4266
to match 1.06 of average intangible to tangible deflator ratio within the period. I
assumed Cobb-Douglas and set γ2 = 1− α2. The discount rate taken as r = 0.04 to
match the real interest rate of 4% per annum. The tangible and intangible capital
depreciation rates are taken as δT = 0.1 and δI = 0.158 respectively from Fernald
(2014). The persistence and standard deviation of the productivity shock is taken
as ρ1 = 0.95 and σ1 = 0.01 respectively from Greenwood et al. (2000). Table 3.1
summarizes the parameters.
Table 3.1: Parameter values
Param Value Model interpretation Target
θ1 0.625 Capital elasticity of tangibles in technology 1 25%, NIPA tangible income share
α1 0.4 Output elasticity of capital in technology 1 40%, NIPA capital income share
γ1 0.6 Output elasticity of labor in technology 1 60%, NIPA labor income share
θ2 0.64 Capital elasticity of tangibles in technology 2 0.27, NIPA intangible-tangible ratio
α2 0.4266 Output elasticity of capital in technology 2 1.06, NIPA intangible-tangible price
γ2 0.5734 Output elasticity of labor in technology 2 1− α2, assumed Cobb-Douglas
δT 0.1 Tangible capital depreciation rate Fernald (2014)
δI 0.158 Intangible capital depreciation rate Fernald (2014)
r 0.04 Discount rate 4% per annum
ρ1 0.95 Persistence of productivity shock Greenwood, Hercowitz, and Krusell (1997)
σ1 0.01 Std of productivity innovation Greenwood, Hercowitz, and Krusell (1997)
8The intangible capital accounted is the intellectual property capital from NIPA table
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3.4 Theoretical results
This section shows the impulse response functions of the productivity shock in differ-
ent settings, including the benchmark case, cases with different degrees of dependence
on intangible capital, and cases with different time periods.
3.4.1 Benchmark
In general, simple dynamic stochastic models of firm investment under uncertainty
without adding adjustment costs cannot generate hump-shaped impulse response
functions of a productivity shock because the models lack a channel to trade-off cur-
rent period profit for future profit streams. In other words, the model is static because
maximizing its present value of discounted profit flows is equivalent to maximizing
profit flow one period at a time (See chapter appendix 3.A.1 for such simple case).
In my model, instead, I introduced a new channel to allow intertemporal trade-off
of profit flows via the time-to-build nature of firm-specific intangible capital. More
specifically, the firm has an option to allocate factors of production to either produc-
tion of final output in current time period or to the production of intangible capital
in the current period to produce more final output in the future. This decision of the
firm induces trade-off between current versus higher future earnings, that is, intertem-
poral substitution. As long as there exists a firm-specific type of capital, the model
will be able to generate hump-shaped impulse responses on output. The intuition is
that with time-to-build firm-specific intangible capital, the firm has a future reliance
on the marginal creation of intangible capital stock accumulated over time which uses
current inputs to create. This intertemporal linkage allows the model to propagate
shocks into the future and generate hump-shaped responses on output. With a posi-
tive productivity shock, final output, tangible investment, and intangible investment
rise above their steady-state. Figure 3·1 shows the impulse responses to one standard
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deviation of productivity shock. The vertical axis of a variable is in terms of percent-
age deviation from the steady-state. The impulse response function of output to the
productivity shock is hump-shaped with its peak at the tenth period. With the pres-
ence of the firm-specific intangible capital in the model, the persistence of tangible
investment is also much higher. Figure 3·13 and 3·14 in the chapter appendix 3.A.4
show all the impulse responses to the productivity shocks in the benchmark case.





































Figure 3·1: Impulse responses to productivity shocks (productivity
shock, final output, tangible investment and intangible investment)
3.4.2 Different degrees of dependence on intangible capital
Figure 3·2 shows the impulse responses to a one standard deviation of productivity
shocks in settings with different capital elasticity of tangible capital θ1. Observed
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that a higher degree of dependence on intangible capital means a lower degree of
dependence on tangible capital θ1 which generates a hump-shaped impulse response
with a more delayed peak, ceteris paribus. If we have the corner case θ1 = 1, that
is, no dependence on intangible capital, then there is no intertemporal dynamics and
no hump-shaped responses on the output (see figure 3·9 in chapter appendix 3.A.1).
The lower θ1, the higher dependence on intangible capital in final output production,
the lower marginal product of tangible capital and the higher marginal product of
intangible capital. The future relies more on intangible capital and hence its marginal
product and the peak delayed.













































Figure 3·2: Impulse responses to productivity shocks with different
capital elasticity of tangible capital θ1 (productivity shock, final output,
tangible investment and intangible investment)
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3.4.3 Different time periods
Figure 3·3 shows the impulse responses to a one standard deviation of productivity
shocks in settings with different time period. I re-calibrate the benchmark model to
match the empirical moments in the post-periods from 1987Q2 to 2019Q4 and the
pre-period from 1955Q1 to 1987Q2. Observed that the post-period has a stronger
impulse responses on output with a more delayed peak. This make sense because in
the post-period, the intangible to tangible investment ratio is higher and the economy
has a higher share of intangible capital over time.







































Figure 3·3: Impulse responses to productivity shocks in different pe-




This section shows the empirical results including an intangible to tangible invest-
ment ratio series, an intangible to tangible investment price ratio series, and impulse
response functions from a vector autoregressive model in different periods.
3.5.1 Data and empirics
The empirical study uses the post-war US data covering periods from 1955Q1 to
2019Q4. The macro series and their corresponding deflators are obtained from the
National Income and Product Accounts (NIPA) table from the Bureau of Economic
Analysis of the United States (BEA). From NIPA Table 1.1.5. Gross Domestic Prod-
uct, I extracted the proxy for output, gross domestic product (GDP), the proxy for
tangible investment, gross private domestic investment minus intellectual property
products, and the proxy for intangible investment, intellectual property products.
From NIPA Table 1.1.9. Implicit Price Deflators for Gross Domestic Product, I
extracted the price deflator for GDP, the price deflator for gross private domestic
investment, and the price deflator for intellectual property products.
Figure 3·4 shows that the intangible to tangible investment ratios are rising over
time, whereas the intangible to tangible investment price ratios are declining over
time. Figure 3·12 in the chapter appendix shows more ratio series. In sum, I find
that (1) the real tangible investment to real GDP ratio is roughly constant; (2) the
real intangible investment to real GDP ratio is rising over time; (3) Both the tangible
and the intangible investment prices (deflators) are declining; (4) The intangible
investment price is declining faster than that of the tangible investment. In fact,
(3) and (4) above implies that the real intangible investment shares are rising more
rapidly than that of the nominal shares.
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Figure 3·4: Investment ratios and investment price ratios
3.5.2 Structural vector autoregressive model
Vector autoregressive models have been widely used in recent years to analyze the
effects of different types of shocks on the macroeconomic series. See Stock and Wat-
son (2016) for a recent survey which provides an overview of methods for identifying
shocks in structural vector autoregression, and see Ramey (2016) for a recent sur-
vey which reviews and synthesizes current understanding of the shocks that drive
economic fluctuations.
To feed the data into a VAR model, I first deflate the series by its corresponding
price deflator to transform the nominal variables to real variables. Second, all real
series are log-differenced so that they are all covariance stationary. Specifically, let:
Xt =








BjXt−j + et (3.68)
I imposed short-run restrictions on matrix A and determined p = 4, that is, 4 lags
for each variable.
3.5.3 Impulse response functions
Figure 3·5 shows the impulse response functions to an output shock in the sample
period. It shows a hump-shaped response function of output. In this figure, the
responses are in terms of growth rate since the VAR variables are in log-difference
form. To obtain the impulse response functions of the variables on their level, we
should look at the cumulative impulse response functions instead. Figure 3·6 shows
the cumulative impulse response functions to an output shock in the sample period.
The cumulative response function of output is hump-shaped and peaked at period 5.
Since the investment shares of intangible capital and its relative price are highly
quantitatively different in different periods as shown in figure 3·4, I split the data
series into two periods, namely pre-period and post-period, from 1955Q1 to 1987Q2
and from 1987Q2 to 2019Q4, respectively and constructed two VAR models with the
exact setting except for the data input. Figure 3·7 and 3·8 show the impulse response
functions and the cumulative impulse response functions of real output shock to the
real output, respectively. Observed that in both periods, the response functions are
both hump-shaped either in cumulative and non-cumulative cases. Specifically, in the
post-period with relatively higher intangible capital shares, the responses are stronger
with a more delayed peak, which is qualitatively consistent with what one can observe
from impulse response function on the top-right panel of figure 3·3 generated from
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Figure 3·5: Impulse responses to real output shocks (real output, real
intangible investment, and real tangible investment)
the theoretical model.
3.6 Conclusion
This chapter extends a simple model of firm investment uncertainty to introduce
internal creations of firm-specific intangible capital as an additional technology con-
straint in the production process. With this process, firms can trade-off profit flows
across time. Simulation is run by choosing suitable parameter values of the model to
investigate the impact of productivity shocks on the main variables of the firm’s in-
vestment problem. My model predicts that firms in which final good production with
a higher dependence on firm-specific intangible capital generates a stronger degree
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Figure 3·6: Cumulative impulse responses to real output shocks (real
output, real intangible investment, and real tangible investment)
of hump-shaped impulse responses with a more delayed peak even without explicitly
adding any kind of standard adjustment cost component. Moreover, introducing this
type of capital also imposes time-varying wedges between factor input prices and
marginal products, and hence, allows the firm to earn non-zero economic profit flows.
On the empirical side, I find that the impulse responses of output at the macro level
are indeed hump-shaped generated by a VAR model. Comparing the responses in the
post-period to that in the pre-period, the post-period is stronger with a more delayed
peak, which is consistent with the responses generated from the theoretical model
calibrated to match the moments in the corresponding periods.
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Figure 3·7: Impulse responses to real output shocks in different peri-
ods (real output normalized by the first period)
Figure 3·8: Cumulative impulse responses to real output shocks in
different periods (real output normalized by the first period)
3.A Appendix for the chapter
3.A.1 Case without intangible capital
Consider a corner case of my model with θ1 = 1, that, is, intangible capital is no longer






and the problem becomes



















+ (1− δT )
]
= 1 (3.72)
This yields two equations with two endogenous variables: yit, and k
T
it+1. They are
static conditions and the firm maximizes static profit flows. There is no channel
to trade-off profit flows across time. Figure 3·9 shows all the impulse responses
to the productivity shocks in the corner case of θ1 = 1, that is no firm-specific
intangible capital. Clearly, no hump-shaped response can be generated with static
profit maximization problem.
3.A.2 Case with adjustment cost but no intangible capital
Consider intangible capital is no longer required to produce final output, but with a




V (statesit) = max
controlsit
{







kit+1 = xit + (1− δ)kit (3.75)
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Figure 3·9: Impulse responses to productivity shocks in a simple
model without firm-specific intangible capital (output, capital, invest-




kit+1 = xit + (1− δ)kit (3.77)
















+ (1− δT )qit+1
]
(3.79)
4 equations with 4 endogenous variables: yit, kit+1, qit+1, xit+1. Figure 3·10 shows
all the impulse responses to the productivity shocks in the case with a quadratic
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adjustment cost component but without intangible capital. Observed that model






































Figure 3·10: Impulse responses to productivity shocks in a model with
a quadratic adjustment cost component but without intangible capital
(output, capital, investment, Q, marginal product of capital, labor, and
productivity shock.)
with a quadratic adjustment cost imposed is able to generate hump-shaped responses
because the optimization problem allows trade-off of profit across time.
3.A.3 Case when none of the type is firm-specific
Consider a typical two types of capital case, where none of the types is firm-specific.




















it + (1− δT )kTit (3.83)
kIit+1 = x
I































it+1, kit. Figure 3·11 shows
all the impulse responses to the productivity shocks in the case when none of the
types is firm-specific. Observed that when there is no firm-specific capital, the model
cannot generate hump-shaped responses because the conditions are static and the
firm maximizes static profit flows when they can directly purchase capital. There is
no channel to trade-off profit flows across time.
3.A.4 All other figures
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Figure 3·11: Impulse responses to productivity shocks in a model with
a quadratic adjustment cost component but without intangible capital
(output, capital aggregator, tangible capital, intangible capital, tangi-
ble investment, intangible investment, labor, and productivity shock.)
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Figure 3·12: Macro series ratios
91

















































Figure 3·13: Impulse responses to productivity shocks (final output,
capital in technology 1, labor in technology 1, tangible capital in tech-
nology 1, intangible capital in technology 1, intangible investment, cap-
ital in technology 2, labor in technology 2 and tangible capital in tech-
nology 2)
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Figure 3·14: Impulse responses to productivity shocks (intangible
capital in technology 2, total tangible capital, total intangible capital,
tangible investment, marginal value of intangible investment, produc-
tivity shock)
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